“I should like to be able to love my country and still love justice. I don’t want any
greatness for it, particularly a greatness born of blood and falsehood. I want to keep
it alive by keeping justice alive.” --Albert Camus (1960:3-4)

Chapter 3
Reconstructing Patriotism

Nations emerge due to the coalescing of a variety of forces and factors, ranging from
the relatively concrete (e.g. a shared language; geographical features and constraints) to
the more historically contingent and socially constructed (e.g. the antecedents of war; the
formation of collective identity; the use of myths, memories, and symbols). When these
factors are considered together we see that nations are “imagined” into existence in a
variety of ways, including through discourse and narratives. As a “cultural artifact” the
nation and the nationalisms associated with it elicit deep emotional responses, inspiring
love and self-sacrifice in significant measures (Anderson 1991:4,141).

More broadly, nationalism is also a way of thinking, a kind of consciousness which
perpetuates the notion that the nation-state is a normal, natural, and preferable way to
order political and cultural affairs (Billig 1995:10,43). Five nationalist ideas within the
dominant symbolic repertoire of the United States have aided power-holders in not only
minimizing dissent to war, but also in generating high levels of popular opposition to
peace movements: (1) the nation and the state are synonymous; (2) the state protects the
nation from danger; (3) as “the greatest country on earth,” the United States has a special
responsibility to spread freedom, democracy, and prosperity throughout the world; (4) the
loyalties of racial and ethnic minority groups to the nation are suspect; and (5) a patriot
defends and does not question the state.
Taken together, these nationalist assumptions mean that precious little room exists for a calm discussion of the merits and costs of war. As a result, policy decisions that are very much matters of life, liberty, and death are not informed by the democratic debate that their significance warrants. This is the cultural and political context peace activists in the United States often face. This chapter examines the peace movement’s engagement with the dominant nationalist discourse as it created dialogue and tried to initiate policy change. At times the peace groups challenged dominant nationalist assumptions head on. In other instances, they harnessed them. Reflecting both the depth of socialization into the dominant nationalist discourse as well as the strategic dilemmas that responding to hegemony presents, all groups both challenged and harnessed nationalism as a facet of hegemony (sometimes even within the same statement). Table 3.1 summarizes frequently recurring responses by the peace movement to the five assumptions mentioned above. In what follows, we will first explain each of the five nationalist assumptions, then describe the ways the peace movement challenged that assumption, followed by how they harnessed it.

Peace Movement Responses to Dominant Nationalist Assumptions

TABLE 3.1 ABOUT HERE

Nationalist Assumption #1: The Nation and the State are Synonymous

As the term “nation state” suggests, the government is widely viewed as synonymous with the nation. The equating of nation and state is connected to the ideology of the Republic, where citizenship is defined through participation in public life (Flynn 2000). Since elected officials presumably make decisions that reflect their constituents’ wishes, a belief in the power of representative democracy adds legitimacy to the formulation.
Because of the conflation of nation and state, policies propagated by the state are viewed as the will of the people. Opposing the state’s policies is tantamount to opposing the nation itself. On the other hand, when power-holders discursively equate the nation with the state, their calls for war are likely to elicit a positive response from the general public. In fact, all five of the highest approval ratings ever received by a U.S. president in Gallup’s polls were associated with the early stages of major wars. George W. Bush’s approval rating shot up from 51% on September 11, 2001 to 89% on September 22, 2001, the second highest approval ratings in U.S. history. While the average bump in approval ratings from the “rally around the flag effect” is historically about 11%, in the immediate post-9/11 period President Bush enjoyed a whopping 38% increase. The belief that the nation and the state are synonymous is so pervasive in how Americans write, talk, and think about their national identity, that even oppositional peace groups are no exception. All 15 organizations at least once equated nation and state. Nonetheless, several of these same PMOs challenged this assumption by de-coupling the nation from the state.  

Challenging Nationalism: The State is Not the Nation

Due to its strategic focus upon electoral and legislative change, MoveOn.org frequently juxtaposed the Bush Administration with a nation opposed to its policies: “President Bush believes he doesn't have to listen to the American public—which, even during war, has overwhelmingly been skeptical or strongly resistant to the idea of an American empire…The election in 2004 is our chance to take our democracy back” (MoveOn, April 24, 2003).

Trying to protect civilians during war, Pax Christi de-linked the nation from the state during two different conflict periods, including Kosova/o: “Just response to aggression
must also be discriminate. It must be directed against unjust aggressors, not against innocent people. As the international community seeks to hold the Yugoslav government accountable, it must not hold the Serbian population hostage” (Pax Christi, July 30, 1999).

Shortly after 9/11, Pax Christi also used a similar argument to narrow the scope of who is considered an enemy of the American nation, at the same time calling for protection of civilians in the Middle East:

   Right now across the Islamic world, innocent people are living in terror, wondering what President Bush may do to them. The President says, ‘We shall make no distinctions between the terrorist and countries that harbor them.’ Shall a whole country be condemned for the actions of its leaders? (Pax Christi, September 26, 2001).

   In part because nationalist assumptions are so heavily reinforced during war, oppositional movements also chose to harness the assumptions instead of, or in combination with, challenging them.

_Harnessing Nationalism: Democratic Accountability_

   The assumption that the state is synonymous with the nation is predicated upon another—that the United States is a representative democracy, where government officials are held accountable to the rule of law. If officials violate the law, mislead the people, or enact policies that contravene the people’s will, they should be replaced. Violations of these tenets of representative democracy provide discursive opportunities for social movements to mobilize opposition.

   The Fellowship of Reconciliation, Pax Christi, and Peace Action each insisted that the Bush Administration receive Congressional approval before using military force in the Persian Gulf. In a legislative alert, Peace Action stated: “Whether or not the U.S. goes to war in the Persian Gulf is not a decision to be left to one man. Our Constitution makes
this the responsibility of Congress, not the President” (Peace Action, late 1990f). By appealing to the Constitution—a sacred text and founding myth in the American civil religion—these statements harness a core assumption in the dominant nationalist discourse (for more on civil religion in the U.S., see chapter five). A decade later, Peace Action again demanded Congressional oversight:

The resolution authorizing the President to use force against those responsible for the September 11, 2001 attacks does not extend to a war on Iraq. Congress must hold hearings and vote on any potential war with Iraq or any other country. It’s our job to hold Congress accountable to its own duties and to the growing voice of America’s conscience (Peace Action, 911 Growing Voice).

By framing their opposition to war in terms of demanding adherence to the Constitution, peace activists presented themselves as citizen protectors of the democracy that empowers the nation (see also Chapter 1). They also did this by highlighting government deception. After no weapons of mass destruction were discovered in Iraq, groups like MoveOn.org demanded a full investigation: “A President may make no more important decision than whether or not to take a country to war. If Bush and his officials deceived the American public to create support for the Iraq war, they need to be held accountable” (MoveOn, June 16, 2003). In addition to demanding Congressional hearings, MoveOn notified its virtual members of a “Claim vs. Fact database” created by the Center for American Progress. MoveOn reported that the database contains “statements from conservatives like President Bush, Vice President Cheney, members of Congress and Fox News personalities and compares those statements to the facts.” MoveOn also placed a television ad that showed a polygraph blipping every time the President made a statement. The campaign culminated in a petition signed by more than
500,000 members calling upon Congress to “censure President Bush for misleading us into war” (MoveOn, February 18, 2004).

Peace groups also portrayed the decision to go to war as undermining democracy by contravening the expressed wishes of the American people. During the Iraq War build up, Peace Action stated:

In a country where only half of eligible citizens exercise their vote, the reluctance of Congress members to listen to their constituents will continue to disengage and disenfranchise potentially active citizens. This is Congress' opportunity to re-engage Americans by empowering our democratic system rather than neglecting it. (Peace Action, September 2002).

By equating their policy positions with the will of the people, peace groups presented themselves as defending the nation against the tyranny of the state.

Nationalism may even be harnessed to generate support for revolutionary change, as the War Resisters’ League did by referencing a core national myth:

If we accept this analysis of the non-representative nature of our government, then our nation’s own heritage tells us what we must do. We read in the Declaration of Independence of governments “deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed”; and “whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new Government (War Resisters League, October 3, 2003).

By harnessing the assumption that the United States should be a representative democracy, WRL severed the cord between the nation and the state. In the process, defending the nation from tyranny logically requires withholding consent from an undemocratic state.

Nationalist Assumption #2: The State is the Defender of the Nation

Power-holders use the equating of the nation and state to legitimate both domestic and foreign policy agendas. Other aspects of the dominant symbolic repertoire make dissent against foreign policy decisions especially problematic. Within an anarchic
international system, it is widely assumed that one of the primary roles of the state is to protect the nation and its citizens from external threats to their physical wellbeing (see Chapter 7). From this perspective, war becomes a fight for the nation’s very survival. Support for the state becomes the primary duty of every citizen who shares the fate of the nation. Conversely, by exposing the nation to harm and danger during its time of greatest need, resistance to war constitutes a grave betrayal of the nation and even suggests an abrogation of citizenship. Peace groups responded to this facet of the dominant nationalist discourse in two very different ways. We now offer examples of both approaches, starting with challenging responses.

**Challenging Nationalism: The State Endangers the Nation**

The realpolitik assumption that the State must use organized violence to protect its citizens often leads to the summary dismissal of peace activist claims as unrealistic. Peace groups challenged this assumption by arguing that State policies threaten the safety of the nation. This challenge was made repeatedly after September 11th in response to the “war on terrorism” discourse. Two weeks after 9/11, Pax Christi warned:

In this climate of international disorder, where the most powerful can act with impunity, it should not surprise us that some among the disenfranchised will strike back in any way that is possible…As long as the strong can lord their power over the weak, terrorism will continue to grow. (Pax Christi, September 25, 2001).

With the mainstream media presenting armed conflicts as if they occur in a historical and political vacuum, peace groups recognized that only through the production of critical-interpretive oppositional knowledge could they convince readers that the State’s war fuels terrorism and endangers the nation. Black Voices for Peace provided a laundry list of foreign policies that endanger Americans:
BVFP believes the domestic and foreign policies of the United States—U.S. military support for Israel's brutal, repressive and illegal occupation of Palestine; sanctions against Iraq, Cuba and Haiti; the bombing of Iraq; the reckless murder of innocent Afghan civilians; the denial of sufficient economic, developmental, trade and health assistance to Africa, the Caribbean, Asia and Latin America...—contribute to international economic exploitation and oppression, political disenfranchisement, and environmental degradation, as well as hatred and attacks against the American government and people (Black Voices for Peace, January 2003).

This discourse presents the government’s militaristic foreign policies as the root source of what threatens the nation. Supporting war, therefore, gives rise to the very conditions that power-holders insist require a military response.

Yet the deeply engrained assumption that the state protects the nation makes many in the general public summarily dismiss such challenges. The notion that “peace comes through strength” is oft-repeated and widely accepted. Only superior military capacity and the occasional demonstration of a willingness to use force will keep the malevolent from dominating us the country. Since it is unlikely that challenging this assumption would resonate widely, another approach was often taken to convince the public of the inadvisability of war.

_Harnessing Nationalism: Measured Response as Test of a Great Nation_

Rather than asserting that the U.S. government was a threat to its own citizenry, some passages focused upon how the U.S. government could best use its power to defend the nation. In particular, they argued that a state representing the American people uses its power judiciously and in adherence with the true character of the nation. In so doing, these statements harnessed a facet of the dominant nationalist discourse often referenced by power-holders to legitimate military intervention. For instance, during a December 9, 2001 speech appealing for international support for the war on terrorism, President
George W. Bush stated, “Americans stand united with those who love democracy, justice, and individual liberty. We are committed to upholding these principles, embodied in our Constitution’s Bill of Rights, that have safeguarded us throughout our history and that continue to provide the foundation of our strength and prosperity.”

In contrast to the Bush Administration’s discourse, peace groups claimed that opposing war was more consistent with the true character of the United States. Some peace movement organizations counseled that 9/11 and the national crises it unleashed should be understood as a testing period, a “crucial moment” that created an opportunity for the U.S. to rely on its true values and to uphold its most deeply held constitutional principles. They clearly saw that the definition of what it meant to be an “American” was being contested. For example, WILPF counseled: “Let us demonstrate that our strength is in our resolve to maintain a democratic and free society and break the cycle of violence and retribution” (Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom, September 12, 2001). Similarly, Pax Christi issued statements designed to tap into reservoirs of national pride by consistently calling forth from fellow citizens “the best of [the] U.S. tradition” and the “best of who we are” (Pax Christi, September 25, 2001 and September 26, 2001).

Nationalist Assumption #3: A Light unto the Nations

A strong tradition of isolationism has sometimes undermined the legitimacy of U.S. military operations overseas. For example, the America First Committee argued that the U.S. could best defend itself by staying out of the Second World War. Prior to Pearl Harbor, opinion polls revealed that the majority of the public consistently agreed with this policy position (Gordon 2003). Something more than the immediate physical survival
of the nation needed to be at stake to compel popular support for wars in distant lands.

Enter nationalist myth-making.

Mythmaking is part of nationmaking. It often involves such self-glorifying nationalistic myths as claiming unique skills and special virtues like good will and altruism toward others (Van Evera 1994). U.S. myth-making includes the chauvinistic notion of manifest destiny, Theodore Roosevelt’s reworking of the Monroe Doctrine, and Woodrow Wilson’s use of democracy and self-determination to justify intervention in World War I. As the embodiment of enlightenment, the first among equals, and as the “shining beacon on the hill,” the United States came to symbolize all that is best about nation-states.¹ And for many, this nationalist myth was strengthened further still by positing divine ordination upon it.

During the Senate’s discussion of the Spanish-American War of 1898 and of U.S. expansionism in the Philippines, Senator Albert J. Beveridge articulated the myth rather plainly.

“God…has made us the master organizers of the world to establish system where chaos reigns…He has made us adept in government that we may administer government among savage and senile peoples…And of all our race He has marked the American people as His chosen nation…This is the divine mission of America…We are trustees of the world's progress, guardians of its righteous peace.” January 9, 1900. Congressional Record (56th Cong., 1st Session) Vol XXXIII, pp.705, 711.

Over time, the belief that the U.S. is the “greatest country on earth” became widespread; it is now taken for granted and is largely repeated unquestioned. It has become something like an unconscious national mantra. Many are also fond of adding a divine dimension to the myth as popular radio talk show host Michael Medved always
does whenever he breaks for a commercial, saying that he is reporting from “the greatest
country on God’s green earth.”

It is a truism to say that the U.S. nation has not only the right, but also the
responsibility to protect its way of life from enemies. In the run-up to war—when social
mobilization and citizen sacrifices are most needed—nationalist myths always do the
heavy lifting. The self-glorifying myth of the United States’ unique role means that many
believe that the U.S. has an additional responsibility: to project its power in the service of
spreading liberty, democracy, and prosperity (Gamson 1992). Self-glorifying nationalist
myths largely emanate from political leaders who deploy them to encourage citizens to
contribute to the nation by voting, by paying taxes, but especially by joining the military
and fighting for the country (Van Evera 1994). Supporting the state during war not only
ensures the nation’s survival, it also reaffirms the shared ideals that unite citizens and
make them proud to be members of the nation.

*Challenging Nationalism: An Oppressive Empire*

The assumption that the U.S. government spreads freedom, democracy, and
prosperity was explicitly challenged by the AFSC in efforts to generate opposition to the
U.S. occupation of Iraq:

The ideological roots of this war continue to shape the debate. Some people
believe this is a war of liberation that would bring democracy to Iraq and the
Middle East, while others believe it is an imperial adventure, the extension of a
modern empire and U.S. domination. How people understand the war largely
shapes their understanding of next steps (American Friends Service Committee;
“AFSC Maintains That the U.S. Still Controls Iraq” n.d.).

Peace groups with identities rooted in awareness of class and racial inequalities were
especially likely to portray the U.S. government as denying freedom both at home and
abroad. Black Radical Congress stated: “The war against the innocent people of Iraq is
also a war to intensify the war against the working people in the USA and against the
oppressed of the world. This is a war to bring back old style colonialism where might
makes right and militarism is substituted for negotiation and diplomacy” (Black Radical
Congress; March 20, 2003). Black Voices for Peace asked if a colonizer and human
rights violator could truly lead a war on terror:

We believe the denial of human rights and human needs in this country are acts of
terrorism. Historically and contemporarily, the slave trade, slavery, the massacre
of the indigenous people of this hemisphere, lynching, the burning and bombing
of Black churches, Jim Crow segregation and racial violence, the criminal justice
system, the death penalty, police brutality, rape and sexual violence, and the pain,
suffering and deprivations of poverty and unemployment represent acts and
systems of terrorism (Black Voices for Peace, January 2003).

Rather than being driven by idealism, some PMOs argued that the Gulf War had to do
with greed and the need for oil. Labor groups echoed this framing in their critique of the
Iraq War: “Well, labor knows that this war is about oil profits and U.S. empire; about
distraction from corporate thievery and from a crumbling economy” (New York City
Labor Against the War, March 17, 2003).

Occasionally, power-holders acknowledge these challenges. In his 2006 State of the
Union address, President Bush stated that “America is addicted to oil, which is often
imported from unstable parts of the world.” Such attempts to appropriate oppositional
symbols provide discursive opportunities for social movements to challenge hegemony.
Trying to shore up his support among African Americans, President George W. Bush
frequently spoke at events celebrating Martin Luther King Jr.’s legacy. For instance, on
the January 18, 2002, federal holiday honoring King, he stated:

It is with a great sense of pride and gratitude that we celebrate this 17th national
holiday in honor of Dr. King's life and work. Let us take this opportunity to recall
his vision and renew his call for equal justice for all. We enter this new year and
this annual celebration with a revived national spirit. The events of September 11,
2001, have drawn us closer as a Nation and increased our resolve to protect the life and liberty we cherish. And while our patriotism and neighborly affections run high, these circumstances have given us renewed purpose in rededicating ourselves to Dr. King’s “dream.”

Here the Administration’s response to 9/11 was framed as consistent with a deeply revered national icon’s efforts to liberate an oppressed people. The President emphasized King’s views on racial equality while ignoring his views on poverty and militarism. The FOR and other peace groups seized the discursive opportunity and challenged the assumption that the U.S. spreads freedom and democracy abroad:

President Bush defended the chaos and destruction brought down on the people of Iraq as “liberation,” and promised to bring more “liberation” to the rest of the Middle East - or to any other region where he deems America's interests are being challenged. Dr. King, in his prescient essay on international affairs, The World House, warned that history was cluttered with the wreckage of nations who came killing in the name of liberation and peace. This month, as we celebrate the 75th anniversary of Dr. King’s birth, we believe the great pacifist and civil rights leader would wince at Bush's words, and weep to see what America has become (Fellowship of Reconciliation, January 22, 2004).

By invoking an essay seldom referenced by power-holders, FOR reclaimed on behalf of the peace movement the symbolic potency of Dr. King’s broad critique of U.S. imperialism, otherwise ignored by President Bush.

Harnessing Nationalism: First among Equals

In order to anchor their policy critiques, peace groups also embraced the idea that the U.S. promotes freedom and democracy worldwide. They used the common claim that the U.S. government leads by example to argue that being the first among equals requires diplomacy, multilateral cooperation, and strict adherence to international laws.

The mark of a truly great power is that it exhausts every opportunity of negotiation and diplomacy, bears even the most excessive frustrations and challenges, rather than resort to its military might. For the great power, war is the very last resort, not the exercise of a preemptive option. (American Friends Service Committee, September 20, 2002).
Shortly after September 11th, the FOR took an even more nuanced approach, arguing that relying on nonviolent solutions would actually reflect U.S. policy precedents:

Terrorism feeds on human misery and hopelessness. Weapons of war do not nurture or house or educate people. What if the United States were to call on all nations of good will to undertake a bold plan to eradicate poverty and illiteracy in the world? The Marshall Plan in the aftermath of World War II helped a devastated Europe build a hopeful future. This is a precedent that draws upon the best of our humanitarian heritage; the times call for such idealism again. (Fellowship of Reconciliation, December 20, 2001).

Rather than challenging nationalism by introducing counter-informative knowledge, FOR appropriated and highlighted official knowledge that supported its policy recommendations. Embracing the assumption of U.S. world leadership enabled peace groups to articulate what this leadership should entail.

Nationalist Assumption #4: The Enemy Within

The influence of the ideology of the Republic on nationalist discourse in the U.S. suggests that individuals can become members of the nation simply by assuming the rights and the responsibilities of citizenship through naturalization. A historical analysis, however, suggests that the nation is often implicitly defined by ethnic, religious, and racial categorization. White Anglo-Saxon Protestant politicians and columnists lamented publicly that the Catholicism of Irish and Italian immigrants in the late 19th century would undermine the nation’s commitment to liberty and democracy. Even culturally assimilated groups have found their national loyalty questioned because of the widespread but scientifically falsified and erroneous belief that differences in physical appearance are linked with other genetic differences that produce group-level variations in behaviors, abilities, and loyalties. During World War II, Japanese Americans were interned in far greater numbers than Italian Americans, German Americans, or other U.S.
citizens with ancestors born in ‘enemy states.’ As Lieutenant General DeWitt, the architect of the internment policy, stated: “The Japanese race is an enemy race and, while many second and third generation of Japanese born on U.S. soil, possessed the U.S. citizenship, have become “Americanized,” the racial strains are undiluted.” (Myers 2002:419).

Survey evidence suggests the ongoing persistence of Eurocentric and racialized constructions of national loyalty in the United States. Data from the 1990 General Social Survey shows that Whites are rated most patriotic while Blacks, Asians, and Hispanics are put on the unpatriotic end of the scale. Reflecting the enduring nature of stigma, a multivariate regression revealed a significant relationship between not liking Japan and viewing Asians as unpatriotic (Smith 1990).

These exclusivist strains of nationalist discourse in the U.S. place particular pressure upon ethnic and racial minority groups to distance themselves from the enemy. Other as well as to faithfully reference dominant nationalist narratives. Expressing concern for the wellbeing of those of the same ethnic group residing in an enemy state runs the risk of having one’s national allegiance questioned. To challenge domestic ethnic and racial inequalities is exposing the nation to danger by undermining the unity needed to respond effectively to a common threat.

*Challenging Nationalism: Ethnic Minorities are Scapegoats*

Peace groups devoted an extensive amount of text to challenging the assumption that racial minority groups are a threat to the nation. Scapegoating involves blaming the powerless for social problems in ways that serve the agendas of the powerful. During the build-up to the Gulf War, FOR chastised the government and the media for scapegoating:
The administration and the press have also irresponsibly manipulated racial and ethnic stereotypes to build support for military actions. Racist and demonizing stereotypes of Arabs in general, and Iraqis in particular, have inflamed the language of debate and hampered efforts to look at the human dimensions of the crisis. There has been a dramatic increase in harassment and vilification of Arab and Muslim Americans (Fellowship of Reconciliation, August 30, 1990).

As with several other PMOs during the Gulf War period and subsequently, FOR also appealed to readers to actively resist scapegoating: “Oppose demonization of ‘the enemy’ and actively reach out to Arab and Muslim Americans to counter a climate characterized by racism, xenophobia and hatred” (ibid).

During the Clinton Administration’s bombing of Northern Iraq in 1998, WILPF stated:

Anti-Arab racism is rampant in the U.S. Think about all the negative stereotypes of Arabs all around you. Do you really think all Muslims are violent terrorists? Islam is the fastest growing religion in the U.S. Who did they finger for the bombing in Oklahoma City? Who did it turn out to be? See? This anti-Arab racism makes it easy for the government/multinational corporations/media cartel to demonize Hussein, whip us into a frenzy about "Islamic Jihad terrorists", and get over with a war that doesn't benefit anyone, except… (Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom, 1998b).

In addition, BRC, CAIR, and WILPF all used the bombing of the Federal Building in Oklahoma City to caution against basing domestic and foreign policies upon racial stereotypes.

Harnessing Nationalism: Defending the Nation’s Liberty

Americans are frequently told that they must sacrifice civil liberties to ensure national security during times of war. This belief is directly linked to the assumption that there are enemies living within the territory that present imminent threats. After 9/11, the U.S. peace movement faced a context where high levels of political repression were widely viewed as legitimate means of governance.
U.S. PMOs frequently responded to this legitimated political closure by framing war and political repression as grave threats to a core national value—civil liberties. Davis and Silver’s (2004) national Civil Liberties Survey, conducted in the months immediately following 9/11, found that while Americans were generally willing to trade off civil liberties for greater security, this willingness interacted with the degree of a sense of threat and with the degree of trust in government. Accordingly, PMOs argued that the ultimate threat to national security was not a terrorist attack, but the loss of civil liberties. PMOs anchored their framing squarely in the American tradition of constitutionalism and the importance of preserving civil liberties. They insisted that the job of the true patriot was to uphold the Bill of Rights. For instance, the American Friends Service Committee enumerated a long list of constitutional rights whose use would form a bulwark against the new dangers facing the country after 9/11. They concluded, “Working in your communities to use and protect these rights in the weeks ahead will guarantee that terrorism has not destroyed the fabric of liberty or undercut our Constitution” (American Friends Service Committee, December 19, 2001).

Nationalist Assumption #5: Love It or Leave It

Patriotism is defined by loyalty, support, service, and devotion to one’s country. While patriotism is present in all nation-states, it is particularly strong in the United States (Pei 2003). There are at least three reasons for this. First, as discussed above, the idea that the United States promotes freedom, democracy, and prosperity worldwide makes it more difficult to critique foreign policy. Second, as a pluralist country fed by immigration, the loyalty to the nation that defines patriotism functions like a much-needed glue in the composite national fabric. Third, the strong strain of independent
individualism that is repeatedly lionized in U.S. popular culture—think Horatio Alger, John Wayne, and Arnold Schwartzenegger—eventually retards the development of community and creates feelings of aloneness and isolation (Bellah et. al. 1985). Some argue that these feelings may be assuaged by the expression of strong patriotic sentiments (Janowitz 1985).

Patriotism, however, is not a one-way street. It not only serves the belonging and meaning needs of the individual, but the group also depends in some measure on patriotism for its continued existence. Yet there exist obstacles to the development of patriotic feelings toward the broader collectivity. The members of large groups cannot directly experience anywhere near the full scope of the group’s membership; the group as single unit escapes their physical perception. That is one reason why patriotism toward large entities like the United States and other nation-states has to be intentionally fostered and learned over time (Bar-Tal and Staub 1997). National political leaders exert considerable energies to impart patriotism to the nation’s members and to solidify it as a required characteristic of group membership.

Frequently, these efforts lead to destructive forms of patriotism marked by an uncritical loyalty to the nation and intolerance of criticism. These iterations of patriotism also include a willingness to disregard the welfare of those who are not part of the nation (Schatz and Staub 1997; Staub 1997; Schatz, Staub and Lavine 1999). Moreover, these forms of patriotism are related to political disengagement, militaristic nationalism, and a desire for cultural purity (Schatz and Staub 1997). The ideological assumptions that underline strident patriotism make opposition to the peace movement an important form
of identity construction. To mobilize against peace movement challenges is to demonstrate one’s commitment to the nation.

**Challenging Nationalism: Americans Should Be Ashamed**

The popular wartime phrase of “love it or leave it” promotes uncritical and destructive patriotism by attempting to silence criticism of the U.S. government or of prevailing social practices. Under this particular nationalist logic, it generally follows that opposing the war means to oppose the government, the American way of life, and the one nation, under God, indivisible, with liberty and justice for all. This is one reason why peace demonstrations frequently draw vociferous counter demonstrations, particularly during war. When participants at an ongoing peace vigil in Colorado Springs decided during the Gulf War to fly a U.S. flag, they repeatedly suffered name-calling (“traitors”), spitting, intimidation, threats, harassment and even physical violence from other residents who supported the war and who were outraged at the protestors’ use of the flag—a nationalist symbol—to criticize government policy (Andrews 1997). By failing to support the U.S. state in the prosecution of its special mission, peace activists so dishonor the nation that they are considered treasonous.

In response to this uncritical patriotism, several peace groups challenged head-on the assumption that U.S. citizens should be uniformly proud of their country. Military conflicts in the Middle East were frequently framed as servicing Americans’ addiction to oil, as typified by this Peace Action statement prior to the Gulf War:

Now we are in a terrible mess. And the worst of it is, it's all for oil—to keep the supply plentiful and the cost of it low. We are prepared to shed blood not to further democracy and human rights in the area—few such rights exist; not to defend the independence of Saudi Arabia—were oranges the country's chief export, no American soldier would be there; not to defend the American way of life; but merely to support an American lifestyle where two percent of the world's
population consumes 25 percent of its oil. If imposing suffering on behalf of 
greed is right, what’s left to be called wrong? (Peace Action, August 24, 1990).

More than a decade later, CODEPINK used similar framing in describing the purpose of 
its citizens tour of Iraq: “We will express our horror at the possibility of a war against the 
innocent Iraqi people because of our addiction to oil” (CODEPINK, January 2003).

Peace groups also argued that uncritical patriotism resulted in military intervention 
abroad and political repression at home becoming the American way of life. During the 
Gulf War, some groups created radical-envisioning oppositional knowledge by insisting 
that meeting domestic needs will make Americans truly proud.

Our strength as a nation comes from providing equal opportunity for all our 
citizens to lead healthy and productive lives…We need to invest in affordable 
housing, in alternative energy programs, in education and environmental 
protection. With the right investments we can create jobs and improve the 
strength of our economy (Peace Action, late1990c).

Thirteen years later, during the Iraq War, the War Resisters League offered a similar 
vision:

Hope of change, in the long term, requires a change in our own national values. 
We are in a country driven mad by fear, driven to spend obscene sums on the 
military at a time when the poor among us cannot find medical care or housing 
and when even those who are employed find themselves driven against the wall 
by cutbacks in social services (War Resisters League, March 21, 2003).

Few like to hear that what they’ve been taught to believe in is a lie: that the U.S. 
government and the U.S. way of life actually threaten the American people and the 
rest of the world. In recognition of the limited ability of challenging hegemony to 
capture the hearts and minds of those who are intensely proud of being American, 
peace groups often pursued a quite different approach to framing.

_Harnessing Nationalism: Promoting Peace is Patriotic_
Some U.S. peace groups promoted loyalty to the nation and embraced American identity while simultaneously arguing that this loyalty conflicts with unconditional support for the state. The usage of American identity themes was particularly strong in countering the war in Afghanistan. While there was broad popular support in the United States for bombing Afghanistan and the larger effort to hunt for Al Qaeda members, AFSC, FOR, WILPF and Pax Christi each flatly rejected equating patriotic loyalty with support for U.S. policies in Afghanistan. NYCLAW explicitly harnessed American identity by proclaiming, “we are proud to be American trade unionists against the war,” linking a traditionally pro-American image of the “trade unionist” to the anti-war movement (New York City Labor Against the War, November 18, 2001).

Harnessing “American identity” thus redefined patriotism to mean dissent, including dissenting from a War on Terrorism that, while it may have had a just cause, was nonetheless being waged in an unjust manner according to the PMOs. Protest became defined as a legitimate means of showing love for one’s country. Pax Christi turned the tables on those who used patriotism to silence policy critics when it claimed that the highest form of patriotism is criticism itself:

There will be those who will try to tell us that criticizing our national policies in time of crisis is unpatriotic. But as William Fulbright, the former Senator from Arkansas reminds us, ‘Criticism is more than right; it is an act of patriotism, a higher form of patriotism, I believe, than the familiar ritual of national adulation. All of us have the responsibility to act upon the higher patriotism which is to love our country less for what it is than for what we would like it to be (Pax Christi, September 26, 2001).

When the various ways that the PMOs both challenged and harnessed nationalism during these different conflicts are viewed together, it becomes apparent that the U.S.
peace movement has developed a form of patriotism marked in varying degrees by the three central components of what Ervin Staub (1997) has termed “constructive patriotism”: (1) a critical consciousness which includes the ability to independently evaluate biased information on policy and national events; (2) critical loyalty which includes dual commitments to the group’s welfare and to universal ideals and values; and (3) a willingness to deviate from, resist, and challenge the current direction of the group. Here the nation’s identity is not just defended, but positively and actively reconstructed on an ongoing basis, with the well-being of others also in mind. In addition, it is also clear that the peace movement’s challenging and harnessing of hegemonic notions of nationalism were not done in some willy-nilly fashion. Nor did they occur according to the whim or mood of the activists who drafted the organizational statements. On the contrary, the choice to challenge nationalism, to harness nationalism, or to blend the approaches appears to have been a considered one, as the longitudinal trends we highlight below indicate.

Longitudinal Trends

Although rarely demonstrated empirically, it has often been presumed that social movements are in a dynamic relationship with the social forces, institutions, and authority systems against which they are contending. This means that if social movements are to remain relevant and effective they must adjust their discourse, their actions, and their tactics in response to the shifting political context, power differentials and arguments of their opponents. Put another way, the relationship between structure and agency is dynamic: as political, discursive, and emotional opportunities shift, social movements face moments of decision about how best to act and react.
For example, when the Reagan administration dramatically increased military spending in the 1980s and coupled it to hard line rhetoric suggesting that limited nuclear wars were feasible, a breakdown in elite consensus soon followed. Members of the U.S. foreign-policy establishment, emboldened by strong opposition from European allies to Reagan's discourse, spoke out and against the policies of this popular president (Gamson and Meyer 1996). The nuclear weapons freeze movement (an off-shoot of the U.S. peace movement) recognized and exploited this emergent political opportunity, fashioning a new set of arguments for disarmament that directly challenged dominant assumptions fueling the arms race. The movement focused on the simple idea of zero growth in nuclear weapons. It was an idea whose time had suddenly come as it resonated with the fears brought on by Reagan's radical rhetoric and perilous policies. The freeze movement grew with remarkable speed partly as a result.

Empirically capturing shifts like these requires a systematic approach to data analysis and presentation. In order to track whether and how the peace movement adjusted its discourse about nationalism across conflict periods, we created two groupings or bundles of codes that were strongly related to the dominant nationalist discourse (see Appendix 2). One bundle includes codes that reflected movement attempts to challenge nationalist assumptions. The other bundle includes codes that reflected attempts to harness nationalist assumptions (see Appendix 2 for details on all code bundles). Table 3.2 reveals significant variations in the frequencies of challenging and harnessing nationalism across conflict periods. Mean comparison tests indicate that the 5 PMOs included in the analysis engaged the dominant nationalist discourse significantly less during the Iraq
1998 period and significantly more during the 9/11 and Iraq War periods when compared to the overall mean for all codes for the other four conflict periods.

TABLE 3.2 ABOUT HERE

The peace movement challenged nationalism least during the Iraq 1998 conflict and most during the Iraq War. One-way analyses of variance indicate that, although variations in levels of challenging nationalism across periods were not statistically significant, variations in levels of harnessing nationalism were. Collectively, the groups were most likely to harness nationalism during the 9/11 period and least likely during the Iraq 1998 conflict.

In terms of the mixture of challenging and harnessing nationalism, PMOs challenged nationalism more than they harnessed it in three of the conflict periods (Gulf War, Iraq 1998, and Kosova/o), and harnessed nationalism more than they challenged it in the two most recent periods (9/11 and Iraq War). Chi-square tests reveal that the 9/11 period was significantly different from the other conflict periods in its relative emphasis upon harnessing nationalism.

Collectively, statistically significant variations across periods support the idea that the U.S. peace movement adapts its discursive response to nationalism to the particular conjunction of discursive, emotional, and political opportunities present within a given conflict period. The field of framing analysis has rightly been criticized for emphasizing strategic considerations to the neglect of cultural aspects of discourse. However, our data suggest that Steinberg (1999) and others go too far in the opposite direction by calling for a theoretical and methodological breach with framing analysis. Abandoning the argument is costly and premature. The findings suggest that U.S. peace movement organizations
carefully crafted multivalent messages that seized upon context-specific opportunities to achieve resonance and potency with the public.

Adaptability in Framing

Peace groups adapted their framing to respond to the particular discursive, emotional, and political exigencies of the specific conflict. With regard to the below-average levels of challenging nationalism during the Gulf War, on average 71.8% of public opinion poll respondents supported the war. International public opinion was also highly supportive with an average approval rating in five countries of 57.1%. This is the highest level of international public support for any of the five conflicts, including the war in Afghanistan. Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait was a blatant violation of the sovereignty of a U.S. ally. All of the PMOs thought it should be reversed; the question was how should it be accomplished and who should accomplish it. The blessing of the United Nations and the breadth of the international coalition involved in the retaking of Kuwait likely made it less relevant and more difficult for peace movement organizations to challenge U.S. nationalism during this period.

Peace groups devoted a significantly greater proportion of their text to nationalist themes after September 11, 2001. Nationalist themes also prominently entered the discourse of power-holders. In a televised speech to a Joint Session of Congress, President Bush stated, “Tonight we are a country awakened to danger and called to defend freedom. Our grief has turned to anger, and anger to resolution. Whether we bring our enemies to justice, or bring justice to our enemies, justice will be done.” In the same speech, the President praised Republicans and Democrats alike for singing “God Bless America” on the steps of the Capitol along with approving $40 billion to “rebuild our
communities and meet the needs of our military.” In addition, the general public responded to the events of 9/11 with intense national pride. According to a study conducted after 9/11 by the National Opinion Research Center, 97% of respondents agreed “they would rather be Americans than citizens of any other country.”

Peace groups responded to this political and cultural context by intensifying their harnessing of hegemony relative to their challenging of it. In fact, the only two conflict periods during which peace groups devoted more text to harnessing nationalism than to challenging nationalism occurred after 9/11.

The PMOs harnessed nationalism the least during the Iraq 1998 conflict. The 1998 crisis over enforcing the no-fly zone area in Iraq's north and Iraq's cooperation with the UN weapons inspection teams was relatively brief and did not garner significant popular interest. The day after the bombing, a CBS News/New York Times Poll found that only 39% of respondents had been following the situation in Iraq very closely. 22% reported either not closely following the situation or not following it at all. Harnessing hegemonic concepts like nationalism means that a PMO must dance—and delicately—with more than one partner. When challenging movements harness hegemony to attract new members, they risk being perceived by longtime adherents as selling out, as being co-opted. Thus, during the short and relatively low-profile crisis with Iraq in 1998, the peace movement may have felt they had little to gain and more to lose by harnessing nationalism during this period. If anything, domestic conditions were ripe with disillusionment as President Clinton faced impeachment over the Monica Lewinsky affair. Taken together, these findings demonstrate not only adaptability of framing
practices in response to changing political contexts, but also learning over time by the five PMOs.

Fidelity in Framing

The U.S. peace movement is clearly strategic in its discursive choices; the PMOs actively managed the way they presented their views to the public in response to changing cultural and political conditions. Not to be lost in this finding, however, is the companion fact that these organizations were also true to their core assumptions and beliefs over time. A lack of significant variation in levels of challenging nationalism across periods suggests that the movement faithfully referenced ideas that stand in fundamental opposition to nationalist assumptions. In three out of five conflict periods the PMOs challenged nationalism more than they harnessed it. Even during the 9/11 and Iraq War periods, peace groups still challenged nationalist assumptions in substantial amounts of text. In fact, in terms of frequency, groups challenged nationalism to an even greater extent during 9/11 and the Iraq War than during any previous conflict included in our analysis. What does all this tell us about peace movement framing over time?

The pronounced intensification of challenging nationalism during the Iraq War suggests that these PMOs strongly adhere over time to their core oppositional values and to the peace movement’s historic tradition of resistance to war-making. The U.S. peace movement is ideologically driven and strongly values-based, with nationalism going against many of the movement’s bedrock values and transnational ties. Indeed, two of the five PMOs in the longitudinal data are pacifist. Across the 20th century, the U.S. peace movement has been primarily a movement that challenged from the margins or the outside, articulating a truly alternative set of values and beliefs from the dominant
nationalist discourse, including, for example, a rejection of nationalism and a deep commitment to supporting conscientious objectors (Chatfield 1971; Wittner 1984).

Insofar as strongly nationalist sentiments are not widely and warmly welcomed in much of the U.S. peace movement, harnessing nationalism does not come easily. After all, activist’s belief systems do have a constraining influence on the production of meaning (Snow and Benford 2000). In this context, the unparalleled increase in harnessing nationalism by the peace movement during the 9/11 period gains added significance. Perhaps the period demonstrated to movement strategists that it was possible to talk positively and effectively about nationalist identity and to harness nationalist ideas and assumptions without betraying the movement’s core principles and foundational beliefs. This would explain the fact that although there is a steep increase in challenging nationalism from 9/11 to the Iraq War, during the Iraq War the U.S. peace movement still continued to harness nationalism to a significant degree (more so than in any other period outside of 9/11). In addition, despite the steep increase in challenging nationalism from 9/11 to the Iraq War, there is only a very modest increase in the use of American identity-negative framing from 9/11 to the Iraq War (see Figure 3.1). This suggests that the experience of effectively harnessing nationalism during 9/11 included the peace movement overcoming a conceptual hurdle of sorts in affirming and harnessing basic American principles.

FIGURE 3.1 ABOUT HERE

These findings of continuity and fidelity by the peace movement to its core values and beliefs are strengthened further by our longitudinal analysis of the movement’s use of nationalist and oppositional identities. Figure 3.1 shows a spiked increase in the peace
movement’s use of nationalist identities during 9/11, when such identities presumably had wide resonance with a U.S. public under unprecedented attack by outside terrorist forces. However, this spike in the use of nationalist identities by the peace movement was followed by a steep drop-off during the Iraq War, when the PMOs argued that Bush administration policies and the behavior of U.S. troops on the ground in Iraq were badly besmirching U.S. identity worldwide.

At the same time, Figure 3.1 also shows a steady increase in the movement’s use of oppositional identities from Iraq 1998 onward, despite the spike in the use of nationalist identity framing during 9/11. This steadily increasing referencing of oppositional identities suggests fidelity to the movement’s historic oppositional identities. The movement’s harnessing of nationalist identity clearly supplements but does not replace its appeals to gender, class, racial, racial identities (see Chapter 6). The trend also reflects the emergence of flexible, multifaceted movement identities in the age of Internet mobilizations (della Porta 2005; Bennett 2005). The Internet facilitates the diffusion of organizing styles and approaches, making it possible to reach a broad and diverse bystander public relatively quickly and easily. In addition, the forces of corporate globalization made it more essential to make these broad appeals to many identity groupings, as all are impacted by globalization forces (see Chapter 8). Overall, Figure 3.1 illustrates well that the U.S. peace movement found itself caught at the crossroads between periods of resurgent nationalism in the context of globalization.

On the Edge of the Nation: Framing by Ethnic Minority PMOs

The stigmatizing of minority groups perceived to share ancestral origin and cultural practices with enemy combatants presented discursive dilemmas not only for the U.S.
peace movement as a whole, but in particular for peace movement organizations mobilizing on the basis of self-identification with a targeted ethnic group. These organizations are disproportionately likely to be targeted for exclusion, detention, and violence. The stronger the identity boundaries that power-holders draw with the enemy, the more likely it is that the minority group will be widely viewed as not belonging to the nation.

This facet of hegemony presents a major discursive dilemma for PMOs with minority-based identities. On the one hand, rejecting patriotism runs the risk of intensifying attacks on the group by strengthening national identity boundaries. Moreover, minority group members strongly identifying themselves as Americans may be incapable of challenging core assumptions of the dominant discourse. On the other hand, asserting uncritical loyalty to the American nation risks reinforcing a set of assumptions that contributes to the oppression of members of the group both inside and outside of the United States.

To ascertain how some minority-identified peace movement organizations have responded to this dilemma, we compared weighted frequencies for selected codes in statements by the Council of American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) and the Black Radical Congress (BRC) to the mean of weighted code frequencies in statements by twelve other PMOs issued during the Iraq War period. Table 3.3 presents the findings. Reflecting its status as the only organization in our study identified primarily with the ethnic group most stigmatized during the Iraq War (i.e. Muslims), CAIR, more than any other peace movement organization: (1) negotiated the stigmatized identity; (2) attempted to blur identity boundaries by condemning attacks on the nation and asserting their loyalty to the
nation; and (3) used discursive opportunities to criticize the government for oppressing those identified as belonging to the group and living in other societies.

TABLE 3.3 ABOUT HERE

Negotiating Stigma

Negotiation constitutes an important form of collective identity construction. Taylor and Whittier (1992:118) define negotiation as “ways that activists work to resist negative social definitions and demand that others value and treat oppositional groups differently.”

Both BRC and especially CAIR were more likely than other PMOs to challenge negative stereotypes of Arabs and Muslims by portraying the group as convenient scapegoats for the powerful. The BRC drew parallels between the racial profiling of African Americans and Arabs and Muslims:

In the name of fighting terrorism, there is a sharp rise in racist repression. African Americans and other people of color are facing a new level of racial profiling and violence...Arabs, Muslims, immigrants, and people resembling those of Middle Eastern/North African/Central Asian descent are special targets of racist violence and government repression (Black Radical Congress, June 2003).

By constructing a collective identity inclusive of Arab Muslims as people of color, BRC statements encouraged identity-based resistance to political repression.

Reflecting its religious-based identity, CAIR also addressed misconceptions of Islam. In response to the Bush Administration’s raising the terror alert on the day of the Muslim religious observance of Hajj, CAIR not only rejected “any suggestion that Islam and terrorism are inextricably linked,” but also tried to explain the meaning of Hajj:

Hajj, or pilgrimage to the city of Mecca, is a once-in-a-lifetime journey of spiritual purification, repentance and renewal, not an excuse for killing innocent people. (Council on American-Islamic Relations, February 8, 2003).
In the process, the organization sought to effect changes in how the general public viewed their religion and the people who practice it.

Recognizing the negative consequences of scapegoating for the rights of their members, both groups were more likely to use civil liberties framing in their statements when compared to other PMOs. Here they asserted their citizenship rights to equal treatment under the law. When using Hamilton’s Interquartile Range formula as a measure of statistical significance, the data supported that CAIR devoted significantly more text to scapegoat and civil liberties framing than any other group in the dataset, including the BRC. This finding suggests that organizations identified with a minority group directly targeted as part of nationalist mobilization in the United States will devote the most attention to negotiating stigma.

Blurring Boundaries

Table 3.3 supports the idea that a PMO representing an ethnic group heavily stigmatized as the enemy Other during a conflict will devote substantially more of their text towards trying to shift the construction of the ethnic group from being categorized as the enemy Other to being viewed as belonging to the nation. CAIR was significantly more likely to condemn terrorism by paramilitary groups during the Iraq War. CAIR also assiduously avoided making any negative reference to being American. Beyond distancing themselves, and by proxy, Muslim Americans from the enemy Other, CAIR also actively asserted their American identity to a far greater extent than any other PMO in our dataset. In its statements, the group repeatedly referred to “American Muslims.” In opposing the USA Patriot Act, the group declared that “We stand firmly in support of our nation's security” (Council on American-Islamic Relations, July 30, 2003).
In contrast, the BRC, made greater than average negative references to being American, thereby strengthening identity boundaries. The organization was also less likely than average to make positive references to being American or to condemn terrorism by paramilitary groups. The contrasting framing reflects not only the anti-imperialist, pan-African nationalist ideology of the BRC, but also the greater extent of stigmatization of Arabs and Muslims in the war on terror discourse.

Transnational Allegiances

BRC and CAIR were two of only five PMOs to condemn terrorism by the state. In addition, the types of condemnation issued reflected a deep identification with those being targeted. In response to the start of the Iraq War in March of 2003, BRC stated: “Above all, this war continues the traditions of racial genocide of the U.S. military. Black people have seen the real effects of racial terror and violence. All freedom-loving persons reject terrorism as a form of political intervention” (Black Radical Congress, March 20, 2003). Violations of the human rights of those constructed as belonging to the ethnic or racial group created strong identity boundaries that encouraged these groups to define the U.S. government as the enemy.

Far more than any other group, the Council on American Islamic Relations criticized U.S. soldiers for human rights violations in Iraq. Challenging one of the most revered symbols of the nation is incongruent with CAIR’s careful efforts to blur identity boundaries and assert nationalist membership. These challenges, however, took place in the context of extensive media coverage of U.S. troops killing unarmed civilians and torturing prisoners in Abu Ghraib. The images of fellow Muslims having their basic human rights violated likely triggered identity commitments that made CAIR willing to
run the risk of being defined as an enemy sympathizer. At the same time, the overwhelming evidence of human rights violations presented a discursive opportunity for challenging frames to achieve empirical credibility with an otherwise skeptical U.S. public.

Conclusions

Like Albert Camus, in the quote that opened this chapter, U.S. peace movement organizations wanted to find ways to love their country while still loving justice. But they had an added burden in that they wanted their arguments to have appeal to the general public during wartime. Consequently, they had to critically engage deeply engrained nationalist assumptions that encourage popular support for military intervention abroad and political repression at home. Insofar as nationalism is a way of thinking, the strength and vitality of the assumptions underlying the dominant nationalist discourse presented both obstacles and opportunities to the U.S. peace movement. These obstacles and opportunities were conditioned by the particular political and cultural contexts facing the peace movement in each conflict period. The changing contexts created discursive opportunities that were more or less promising, depending on the intensity of the shifts and on the ability of peace movement activists to recognize the changes and to respond constructively to them. Our longitudinal analysis across the five conflict periods empirically demonstrates that the United States peace movement—represented by five major organizations—evidenced both adaptability in fashioning messages to take advantage of discursive opportunities, as well as fidelity to its core assumptions and beliefs. Moreover, we’ve shown that while the peace movement both challenged and harnessed hegemonic notions of nationalism, they nonetheless primarily focused upon
one approach or the other during one specific conflict. Our analysis has also shown, however, that this patently strategic approach was also infused with deeply cultural considerations, as illustrated by the movement’s fidelity to its historic messages and by the examples provided by CAIR and BRC.

Directly engaging the dominant assumptions undergirding nationalism, as the PMOs did, means that they were also indirectly expressing an alternative understanding of patriotism. Earlier in this chapter we suggested that the peace movement evinced forms of patriotism that Staub (1997) defined as constructive. Our detailed analysis of how the movement discursively both challenged and harnessed the five dominant assumptions of nationalism over a 15 year period demonstrates the many forms of constructive patriotism put forward by the movement. On the one hand, by challenging nationalist assumptions, the peace movement demonstrated critical and evaluative consciousness. On the other hand, by harnessing these same nationalist assumptions, the PMOs evinced critical loyalty to the nation, to movement traditions, as well as to broader values. Even pacifist groups embraced nationalist values, especially immediately following 9/11. Finally, peace movement discourse on nationalism was often designed not only to differentiate between the nation and the state, but also to expand the boundaries of who is considered as part of the nation.

The analytical path that we are following takes advantage of the best of what have often been considered to be competing approaches in social movement research. Many structural approaches have relied on interpretations that don't give proper attention to the agency of movement actors. In so doing, structuralists also often obscure the deeply symbolic components that influence movements. On the other hand, overly cultural
approaches to movement analyses fall prey to discounting the many powerful structural constraints that influence movement actors. We are not only paying attention to both structural and cultural factors, but we are also highlighting the dynamic intersections of these forces as they are engaged by the same U.S. peace movement organizations in different conflict periods. It is in these intersections that social movement decision making about tactics and discourses is at its most robust. The combination of longitudinal and comparative analysis allows us to utilize the best in each interpretive approach while avoiding historic blind spots. It reveals a peace movement that constructs its public statements with care, not only actively honoring its own traditional values and identities, but also taking advantage of emotional and discursive opportunities in order to broaden the appeal of its arguments.
### Table 3.1: Peace Movement Response to Dominant Nationalist Assumptions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dominant assumptions</th>
<th>Challenging assumptions</th>
<th>Harnessing assumptions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Nation is synonymous with the State</td>
<td>The State is <em>not</em> the Nation</td>
<td>Democratic accountability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The State protects the Nation</td>
<td>The State endangers the Nation</td>
<td>Measured response as test of a great Nation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A bastion of freedom</td>
<td>An oppressive empire</td>
<td>First among equals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The enemy within</td>
<td>Ethnic minorities are scapegoats</td>
<td>Defending the Nation’s liberty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Love it or leave it</td>
<td>Americans should be ashamed</td>
<td>Promoting peace is patriotic</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 3.2: Responses to the Dominant Nationalist Discourse by Conflict Period

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conflict period</th>
<th>Sum of nationalism code bundles&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>Challenging nationalism code bundle&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>Harnessing nationalism code bundle&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>Ratio of CN to HN&lt;sup&gt;c&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Col.%</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Col.%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gulf War</td>
<td>192.9</td>
<td>15.9</td>
<td>108.0</td>
<td>17.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq 1998</td>
<td>128.7*</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>86.9</td>
<td>13.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kosova/o</td>
<td>186.9</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>120.0</td>
<td>19.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept. 11&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>363.4</td>
<td>30.0</td>
<td>143.7</td>
<td>23.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq War</td>
<td>339.6*</td>
<td>28.0</td>
<td>167.5</td>
<td>26.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1211.6</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>626.1</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>242.3</td>
<td>125.2</td>
<td>117.1</td>
<td>117.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Std. Dev.</td>
<td>103.1</td>
<td>31.3</td>
<td>75.4</td>
<td>75.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Analysis based on weighted data. For weights formula, see Appendix 2. Only data from the 5 PMOs issuing statements in all five conflict periods included (American Friends Service Committee, Fellowship of Reconciliation, Pax Christi, Peace Action, Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom). Includes only codes that are strongly related to the dominant nationalist discourse. See Appendix 2 for specific codes in bundles.

<sup>a</sup> * p<.10 of t-value for one-tailed difference of means test comparing the frequencies of codes in both the challenging bundle and the harnessing bundle during the conflict period to the frequencies for the other four conflict periods

<sup>b</sup> * p<.10; ** p<.01 of the F statistic for a one-way analysis of variance comparing the frequencies of codes in the bundle during the conflict period to the frequencies for the other four conflict periods.

<sup>c</sup> * p<.10; ** p<.01, *** p<.001 of Chi Square value for a 2x2 table comparing the aggregated frequencies of codes in the challenging bundle and in the harnessing bundle for the conflict period with the means of the aggregated code frequencies for the other four conflict periods.
Figure 3.1: National and Oppositional Identities by Conflict Period

Note: Analysis based on weighted data. For weights formula, see Appendix 2. Only data from the 5 PMOs issuing statements in all five contact periods included (American Friends Service Committee, Fellowship of Reconciliation, Pax Christi, Peace Action, Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom). Oppositional identities include identities based upon class, gender, race, and sexual orientation.
Table 3.3: Comparison of Minority Identified Framing to Other PMOs: Iraq War Period

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organizations</th>
<th>CAIR&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt; (N)</th>
<th>BRC&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt; (N)</th>
<th>Other PMOs (Mean N)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Civil liberties</td>
<td>28.4*</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>8.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scapegoat</td>
<td>15.8*</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religion</td>
<td>20.5</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>16.6&lt;sup&gt;c&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American identity-positive</td>
<td>20.5*</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American identity-negative</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paramilitary terror-condemned</td>
<td>14.2*</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State terror-condemned</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Troops-positive</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>12.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Troops-negative</td>
<td>30.0*</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Analysis based on data weighted for 14 PMOs issuing statements during the Iraq War Period. BVFP excluded due to insufficient number of words of text. For weights formula, see Appendix 2.
* Identified as outlier value using the Hamilton’s Interquartile Range formula. The formula defines a value x as an outlier if x < Q(25)-1.5IQR or Q(75)+1.5IQR < x where Q is the quartile and IQR is the interquartile range. The interquartile range is the difference between the 75<sup>th</sup> and 25<sup>th</sup> percentile.
<sup>a</sup> Council on American-Islamic Relations
<sup>b</sup> Black Radical Congress
<sup>c</sup> Mean for all religious-based PMOs except for CAIR (i.e. AFSC; FOR; Pax Christ)
References


Notes

1. Although it may have originated with the Puritan leader, John Winthrop, President Ronald Reagan was particularly adroit at articulating and manipulating this trope. In his February 2, 1988 “Address to the Nation” urging support for the U.S.-funded war against the Nicaraguan government, he urged citizens to “Help us to win support for those who struggle for the same freedoms we hold dear…We'll be demonstrating that America is still a beacon of hope, still a light unto the nations.”

2. By highlighting the movement’s discursive trends which occur in response to the changing cultural and political contexts facing the peace movement, we do not mean to imply that the peace movement exclusively relies upon one approach during any conflict period. In fact, the two approaches clearly coexist and are even blended at times within the same statement.

3. As a measure of trends in how the mass public reacted to dominant policy discourses, we took the mean of monthly averages of several major public opinion polls in which respondents answered favorably to questions regarding the advisability of military intervention in each of the five conflict periods included in the study.

4. For international public opinion, we used the mean of the average approval rating in five countries (Canada, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, and Russia) for each military intervention. These polls were available less frequently than domestic polls.
As a result, differences in international opinion across conflict periods could be an artifact of the timing of the polls included in the dataset.