The Effects of Competition on SMO Strategy and Survival*

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Abstract

Drawing hypotheses from resource mobilization and resource partitioning theories, this paper examines how inter-organizational competition and social movement industry concentration affect the level of tactical and goal specialization of protest organizations associated with three different social movements: the Peace, Women’s, and Environmental Movements. Additionally, the paper examines how organizational tactical and goal specialization affect survival of these organizations. By and large, the findings are commensurate with the expectations of resource mobilization and resource partitioning theories. Results indicate that inter-organizational competition leads to more specialized tactical and goal repertoires. Concentration in the social movement industry also leads to specialization, but this is only true for less established organizations – more established protest organizations respond to concentration by adopting more general tactical and goal repertoires. Results also indicate that tactical and goal specialization decrease organizational survival, unless the industry is highly concentrated, in which case an organization’s chances of survival increase.
Introduction

Within any given social movement, there is a great deal of variation in the tactics used and goals espoused by the different social movement organizations associated with the movement. Social movements are rarely unified phenomena; instead they are comprised of different organizations that vary with respect to objectives, strategies and tactics (Benford 1993; Gerlach and Hine 1970; Haines 1984). Some organizations associated with a given movement utilize diverse tactics and/or articulate various goals, while others are far more specialized. When considering, for example, the civil rights movement, many historical accounts discuss the wide variety of organizational tactics and goals associated with that movement (e.g., Goldman 1969; Gerlach and Hine 1970; McAdam 1982; Haines 1984; Morris 1984). The National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), for example, was founded in 1909 and initially tended to focus on strategies designed to change public opinion on civil rights. In 1930 a separate wing of this organization, the NAACP Legal Defense Fund, was founded to raise money to be used explicitly for legal activism (e.g., lawsuits to challenge segregation practices). Also within the civil rights movement, the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE) emerged from the Fellowship of Reconciliation and utilized a variety of different tactics directed at challenging segregation. In 1960, the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) was pressured to support the formation of a new organization, Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) to use more radical and visible forms of direct action than SCLC typically did. Existing alongside these organizations, were movement “halfway houses” (Morris 1984), such as the Highlander Folk School (Edwards and McCarthy 1992; Morris 1984), which helped to build and sustain collective identity of civil rights activists. While this is certainly not an exhaustive
list of all civil rights organizations, this discussion illustrates that while there may be a broad, shared goal among a set of social movement organizations, there are also important differences between these organizations with respect to tactics used and goals articulated.¹

Tactical and goal differences between organizations lead to specialization at both the organizational and the social movement levels. On the one hand, organizations can specialize, as is the case of the NAACP Legal Defense Fund, which in the civil rights era used mainly legal activism and made claims about segregation. But on the other hand, at the aggregate level, organizational-level specialization leads to differences in the amount of movement-level specialization. For example, when we consider the entire set of civil rights movement organizations, we can conceptualize the level of specialization as a characteristic of that set of organizations (rather than a characteristic of any single, component organization).

This observation derives from the early work of McCarthy and Zald (1977), who emphasize the need for social movement scholars to concentrate on both individual social movement organizations (SMOs) and the broader configuration of organizations that comprise the social movement industry (SMI).² Within a given SMI, SMOs frequently interact: they

¹ This discussion dovetails with Haines’ (1984) description of the various factions (e.g., moderate and radical) of the Civil Rights Movement. For another discussion of the variation in tactics and goals used by organizations within a different movement, see Benford’s (1993) description of radical, moderate, and liberal organizations comprising the Austin, Texas Nuclear Disarmament Movement.

² According to McCarthy and Zald (1977:1218), a social movement organization is a “complex, or formal, organization which identifies its goals with the preferences of a social movement or a countermovement and attempts to implement those goals.” An SMI is the
share personnel, office space, and information, collectively learn new tactics, and join in coalitions, to name just a few ways in which SMOs interact (Zald and McCarthy 1980). The interaction between SMOs has consequences for both the overall level of tactical and goal specialization of the SMI and for the level of tactical and goal specialization of any of the component organizations.

One form of interaction between SMOs that is not well understood is competition for resources (Zald and McCarthy 1980). Although we would like to think that SMOs in an industry cooperate in order to achieve a common goal, in reality SMOs are often engaged in competition for limited resources (Zald and McCarthy 1980; Koopmans 1993).³ Many have acknowledged that SMOs compete for participants’ contributions of money, time, energy, and skills (e.g., McCarthy and Zald 2001; Zald and McCarthy 1980) and for symbolic goods, like the collection of all social movement organizations “that have as their goal the attainment of the broadest preferences of a social movement” (McCarthy and Zald 1977: 1219). One might think of the SMI as the organizational analog of a “social movement,” which to McCarthy and Zald (1977: 1217) is the “set of opinions and beliefs in a population which represents preferences for changing some elements of the social structure and/or reward distribution of a society.” McCarthy and Zald (1977) also define the social movement sector (SMS) as the aggregation of all SMIs in a particular place, at a particular time. Throughout this paper, we use McCarthy and Zald’s (1977) definitions of the social movement, social movement organization, social movement industry, and social movement sector.

³ It is beyond the scope of this paper to examine organizational cooperation, but this is another important form of organizational interaction. Future research should examine how organizational cooperation impacts organizational specialization as well as sustainability.
prestige (e.g., Benford and Zurcher 1990), but relatively few scholars have attempted to understand the effects of inter-organizational competition on social movement organizational processes (but see Minkoff 1993, 1994, 1995, 1997, 1999; Olzak and Ryo 2004; Koopmans 1993).

What effect does competition have on SMIs and SMOs? Some social movement scholars draw on organizational ecology (Hannan and Freeman 1989) to examine how competition between social movement organizations impacts industry-level changes. For example, Minkoff (1993, 1994, 1995, 1997, 1999) examines how competition affected founding and disbanding rates of organizations in the women’s and ethnic civil rights movements. And, Olzak and Ryo (2004), using a subset of Minkoff’s data on black civil rights organizations, examine how levels of competition amongst these organizations affected the overall level of tactical and goal diversity of the civil rights movement industry. Finally, Koopmans (1993) examines how inter-organizational competition can lead to the escalation or radicalization of tactics amongst “New Social Movements” in West Germany.

This work emphasizes the important insight from organizational ecology that “social changes affect the mix of organizations in a society” (Hannan and Freeman 1989, p. 52, emphasis in original). That is, Minkoff, Koopmans, and Olzak and Ryo study how various characteristics of the SMI drive changes in that population of organizations. In particular, they are interested in understanding how inter-organizational competition affects the character of the social movement industry (or industries) -- Minkoff by studying how competition affects founding and disbanding rates of SMOs in two industries, Olzak and Ryo by studying how competition affects the level of diversity in an industry, and Koopmans by studying how competition affects radicalization of tactics in several industries.
Beyond this, however, there has been little empirical work on the question of how competition between social movement organizations impacts organizational level processes, despite the fact that McCarthy and Zald’s (1977) original hypotheses about the dynamics of SMIs calls for such an approach (see also Zald and McCarthy 1980). In other words, work on inter-organizational competition has examined the effects of competition on the character of the SMI (Minkoff 1993, 1994, 1995, 1997, 1999; Olzak and Ryo 2004; Koopmans 1993), but not how competition affects individual SMOs.

This paper examines how competition between SMOs in three different SMIs (Peace, Women’s, and Environment) affects two important organizational processes: specialization and survival of organizations in these industries. We first assess arguments put forth by resource mobilization theory and resource partitioning theory about how inter-organizational competition and the level of concentration within a given SMI affect the level of tactical and goal specialization of individual organizations within that industry. Following this, we ask how a given organization’s level of tactical and goal specialization affects its chances of survival, net of and in combination with, the overall level of inter-organizational competition in the SMI.

To examine these processes, we use newspaper reports of public, collective action events that took place in New York state between 1960 and 1986 to obtain data on protest organizations active in three different social movement industries: Peace, Women’s, and Environment. We have chosen to focus on these three SMIs because all three have been subject to SMI-level analyses in the past, but were not subject to the kinds of questions we ask and analyses we perform herein (see Minkoff [1993, 1994, 1995, 1997, 1999] on the women’s movement, Andrews and Edwards 2005 on the environmental movement, and Edwards and
Marullo [1995] and Edwards and Foley [2003] on the peace movement). As well, examining these processes across three different SMIs allows us more confidence that our findings are not an artifact of a particular social movement and, as such, allows us to better make contributions to the development of theory surrounding the inter-organizational processes of interest herein.

The data we use includes detailed information on organizational tactics and goals; thus we are able to devise measures of the level of tactical and goal specialization of each organization active in each of these 3 industries during the 1960-1986 period. We find that competition measured in two ways (SMI density and concentration) lead organizations to specialize with respect to both their tactics and goals. In turn, we find that organizations with more specialized tactical and goal repertoires are less likely to survive, unless the SMI is highly concentrated (in which case, specialization appears to offer survival advantages). We discuss the implications of these findings for social movement and organizational studies.

Theoretical Background and Our Argument

In their 1977 article, McCarthy and Zald simultaneously introduced the concepts of the SMO and the SMI and set in motion something of a sea change in social movement studies from a focus on “collective behaviors” (e.g., rumors, fads, mobs, and panics), to a focus on the organizational and rational bases of social movements. Micro-level scholarship on social movements moved away from focusing on how deprivation and maladaptive impulses led

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4 Also note that organizations affiliated with these three movement industries have been found to some of the “most publicized” organizations during this period (Amenta, Caren, and Olasky 2005). And, these three were also found to be important industries across various periods described by Bearman and Everett (1993).
individuals to join movements, to a focus on how movements transform sympathizers or bystanders to participants or adherents. And, scholars became very interested in more meso- and macro-level processes, especially on how organizations and organizational processes facilitate the procurement of resources so essential to movement activity (see recent reviews of Resource Mobilization Theory in Edwards and McCarthy 2004; McCarthy and Zald 2001).

In addition to drawing attention to organizational processes, early resource mobilization theory also highlighted inter-organizational processes by defining both the social movement industry (SMI) and the social movement sector (SMS). As described in an earlier footnote, the SMI is the collection of all organizations associated with a particular social movement, while the SMS is the collection of all organizations associated with all movements in a particular society. As such, one might think of these two concepts as analogous to concepts in organizational ecology (Hannan and Freeman 1989); an SMI is the population of organizations that is directed at seeking change associated with a particular social movement, while an SMS is the community of organizational populations seeking change across all movements (Hannan and Freeman 1977; Ruef 2000).

Interestingly, while the lion’s share of research on social movements focuses on a particular social movement (e.g., case studies of the Civil Rights Movement or Peace Movement), there have been relatively few attempts to study entire SMIs – at least as originally defined by McCarthy and Zald (1977) to include all organizations working toward the goals and preferences of a particular movement. That is, although there are plenty of case

5 It goes without saying that even fewer studies have attempted to examine entire social movement sectors (see Everett 1992). Studying the effects of inter-organizational competition at the sector level is an important next step in this research.
studies of social movements, there are few studies of all of the organizations that comprise these movements (i.e., the SMI). And, of those that have attempted to analyze all organizations comprising a particular SMI, few have attempted to examine how the character of the SMI affects organizational-level processes. This is a shame because some of the most interesting questions raised by McCarthy and Zald (1977) necessitate an understanding of the SMI and how SMI-level processes affect organizational-level processes (see also Zald and McCarthy 1980).

One important organizational-level process is organizational specialization. Casual observations of SMOs associated with a particular industry show that there is a great deal of variation with respect to what organizations do. Some organizations within an industry articulate multiple diffuse goals, while others are far more focused. For example, in our data (described below) the Sierra Club typically offers very broad goals, while Save our Cumberland Mountains is much more specialized with respect to the goals it espouses. Similarly, some organizations use a variety of tactics, while others tend toward specialization. For example, in our data the Real Alaska Coalition used 4 different tactics in one year, while Solar Action used a single tactic in the same year. Despite these observations, specialization of social movement organizations remains largely understudied in the social movement literature (although see King and Cornwall 2005). What factors lead to variation within an industry with respect to organizational goal and tactical specialization?

Early resource mobilization theory (RMT) offers a number of important insights that are critical to understanding why it is that some SMOs have specialized goals and tactics. In particular, RMT hypothesizes that SMOs specialize so that they do not have to compete directly with one another (McCarthy and Zald 1977; Zald and McCarthy 1980). This original hypothesis was based on insights from economists about specialization amongst firms. Under conditions of inter-organizational competition, an organization differentiates its product from that of its competitors (or specializes) in order to capture a distinct segment of the market (Rosen 1974; Zald and McCarthy 1980; Shaked and Sutton 1982). In their original hypothesis, McCarthy and Zald (1977) argue that inter-organizational competition is a function of the number of other SMOs in the industry, or density (but see their further discussion of perfect and imperfect competition in Zald and McCarthy 1980). The “products” that SMOs offer are tactics and/or goals and the hope is that by offering unique tactics and goals, the SMO may be able to appeal to a particular set of potential participants or benefactors (Gamson 1987).

In their original formulation, McCarthy and Zald (1977) also emphasized the importance of discretionary resources available at the societal level. When more resources are available to an existing SMI, competition within that industry is less intense. But during times of economic hardship competition intensifies between organizations. Therefore, general levels of resource scarcity should also be associated with increasing specialization among SMOs.

An important and related argument is offered by resource partitioning theory (RPT), a branch of organizational ecology that attempts to explain specialization in a population of organizations. Resource partitioning theory was originally developed by Glenn Carroll (1985) to study newspaper markets and the tendency of these to be dominated by a few very large generalist newspapers but with smaller, more specialized newspapers existing simultaneously.
when markets are highly concentrated. According to RPT, older, better-established, and larger firms have a competitive advantage over smaller, newer, and less well established firms due to economies of scale, which allow the larger firms to expand their product and resource base at a lower cost than smaller organizations. As a result, in mature industries larger organizations dominate, leading to increasing concentration and a higher level of generalism among surviving organizations. But at the same time, as fewer generalist organizations dominate the industry, specialists are able to emerge and thrive on the fringes of the market by offering specialized products (Carroll and Hannan 1995). This division of the market into heterogeneous resource bases is referred to as “resource partitioning.”

Key to arguments about the effects of resource partitioning on organizational specialization is the level of market concentration, which can be thought of as a different type of competition than is tapped by density (Carroll and Hannan 2000). An industry is highly concentrated when only a few organizations take up a majority share of the industry resources (see also Zald and McCarthy 1980). When an industry is highly concentrated, specialists are able to thrive because they are not in direct competition with generalists. However, when

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8 McCarthy and Zald’s formulation of RMT also gave attention to the “cost reducing mechanisms and structures” (1977, p.1216) that give certain SMOs competitive advantages. Thus, the emphasis of RPT on incumbents’ cost advantages over newcomers is compatible with RMT.
concentration is lower, small specialists are forced to compete with generalists and typically do not fare well in this contest because of their scale disadvantage.

There are obvious similarities between the core arguments of resource mobilization and resource partitioning theories. In particular, both predict that the level of competition in an industry affects levels of specialization of organizations therein. But, there are key differences between the hypotheses offered by each of these two theories. First, RMT (e.g., McCarthy and Zald 1977; Zald and McCarthy 1980) is chiefly concerned with what happens to specific organizations under conditions of competition, while the RPT (Carroll 1985), as an ecological argument, is concerned with what happens to the mix of organizations in a population. Underlying assumptions about the nature of organizational change determine this difference in analytical focus. Resource mobilization theory assumes that organizations are adaptive and alter their level of specialization according to competitors’ behaviors (Minkoff 1999). Resource partitioning theory assumes that organizations are inertial and do not rapidly innovate, thus organizational change occurs at the population-level through selection. So, while both theories predict that specialization is associated with competition, RMT predicts that this happens because organizations change what they are doing when confronted with competitive pressures, while RPT predicts that specialist organizations will have survival advantages when the industry is highly concentrated.

The second difference between the two theories is that RMT is chiefly concerned with competition as a function of the size (or organizational density, per organizational demographers, such as Carroll and Hannan 2000) of the SMI, while RPT suggests that market concentration changes the nature of competition such that industries with high concentration
can have two distinct segments of competing organizations – generalists and specialists.\(^9\)

Thus, in highly concentrated industries, large organizations compete with one another as
genralists, while specialists compete with one another in a partitioned segment of the
industry.

The branch of organizational sociology most concerned with competition,
organizational demography, supports the notion that density and concentration represent
different forms of competition (Carroll and Hannan 2000). Density is assumed to have a non-
monotonic relationship with competition; competition increases at an increasing rate with
higher levels of density. Concentration, on the other hand, suggests the presence of a
partitioning of competition into distinct market segments, as discussed above.

Based on these two theoretical traditions, we test several central hypotheses about how
these two SMI-level indicators of competition (e.g., density and concentration) shape
organization tactical and goal specialization. Following resource mobilization theory, we
argue that *as organizational competition in an SMI increases, SMOs will adopt more
specialized tactical repertoires and espouse more specialized goals*. Individual SMOs are
aware of the tactics and goals of their peers and will attempt to not reproduce efforts. Instead,
increasing competition makes SMOs attempt to find some unique way to address the
particular issue or unique way of framing their goal or claim. Strategies of tactical and/or goal
specialization allow SMOs in the same industry to draw on a similar resource base (e.g.,
membership) without having to worry about members tiring of belonging to multiple SMOs.

\(^9\) Interestingly, Zald and McCarthy (1980) begin to discuss industry concentration as a special
form of competition, however to our knowledge social movement scholars have not (yet)
picked this up and noted the synergy between their arguments and RPT.
RMT also predicts that *when there are fewer resources at the societal level, SMOs will adopt more specialized tactical repertoires and espouse more specialized goals*. Thus, during recessions, resource scarcity, or other times of economic hardship, SMIs exhibit more intense competition between organizations and this, in turn, leads SMOs to try to find unique niches that protect them from direct competition with other SMOs.

Third, we hypothesize that the effects of competition on specialization will not be uniform across all SMOs in the SMI. In a mature SMI, organizations become larger and are more able to adopt new tactics and claims without exhausting their existing infrastructure and resources (Carroll 1985; Swaminathan 2001). Incumbents multiply tactics and claims by incorporating those used by surrounding specialists and are able to do this with relative ease because they already have a substantial resource base on which to draw. The tendency for incumbents to become more complex and sweeping in scale leads to the creation of robust identities that appeal to the needs of a variety of movement activists and resource inputs (Carroll and Swaminathan 2000; Swaminathan 2001). For example, incumbent SMOs may use their dense networks to coordinate large-scale protests at the same time that they conduct sophisticated public relations campaigns and lobby individual legislators. Therefore, we argue that not all SMOs will specialize; rather, *large incumbent organizations will be less likely to specialize, while smaller, less well-established organizations will be more inclined toward specialization of tactics and goals*.

Readers may ask why it is that specialist organizations exist if generalists can perform the same tasks and represent the same grievances at a lower coordinating cost, as we have just noted above. RPT suggests that specialist organizations do not always thrive because of the functionality of their structure and product. In fact, often times the organizational outputs of
generalists are of a higher quality (or at least of equal quality) than those of specialists. For example, macro-brewers proved equally effective at producing custom beer as microbreweries (Carroll and Swaminathan 2000). Macro-brewers, however, face an identity constraint that inhibited their ability to move into the specialty beer market. Customers seeking specialty brews did so because the product conformed to their identities as sophisticated consumers. The status associated with consuming in a boutique brewery was as much sought after as the beer itself.

Similarly, movement activists often adhere to strict personal identities (Stryker 2000) that conflict with the organizing efforts of large-scale, bureaucratized SMOs. A certain portion of the activist (or donor) population, for example, might wish to “act locally,” or at least to disassociate themselves from the largest, most prominent SMOs in a particular industry. Although specialist and generalist SMOs both find themselves fighting for the same social causes, they target specific identity segments of the movement resource base. The emergence of specialist SMOs, therefore, most likely occurs in highly concentrated industries in which entrenched incumbents already exist.

Once we have examined how industry competition and concentration affect what organizational tactical and goal specialization, we then examine how an organization’s level of tactical and goal specialization (net of and in combination with the overall level of competition and concentration within the industry) impacts its chance of persistence or survival. Based on RPT, we expect that SMOs that adopt a more generalist strategy (that is, organizations that utilize less specialized tactical repertoires and espouse less specialized goals), will be more likely to persist. According to ecological theories, generalists have
survival advantages because diversification spreads out risk (Singh and Lumsden 1990; Edwards and Marullo 1995).10 However, we also argue that under certain conditions, generalists will be less likely to persist or survive. Specifically, based on RPT, we expect that when there are higher levels of concentration in the industry, specialist organizations will be more likely to persist or survive and generalist organizations will be less likely to do so. Under conditions of industry concentration, specialized organizations may be better at recruiting and retaining members since they are better able to offer benefits (Olson 1965) tied to specific social movement identities. Much like microbreweries thriving in concentrated markets by offering products that are differentiated from that of the macro-brewers, specialized movement organizations offer a product more resonant with particular activist identities and preferences. Taken together, these hypotheses allow us to predict the factors leading to specialization at both the organizational and industry levels of analysis.

Research Design

Defining the Social Movement Industry

Why have so few scholars examined the dynamics of competition between SMOs within SMIs? First, while McCarthy and Zald (1977) offer a clear working definition of the SMI, in empirical practice it has not been easy to operationally define the industry because it

10 Note that, contrary to this hypothesis, Gamson (1975) found that SMOs with more specialized goals were more likely to survive. As we discuss in more detail below, our analysis allows us to examine the conditions under which specialized SMOs will have survival advantages over generalist SMOs.
is not always clear precisely which organizations should be included; in other words, specifying the boundary of a social movement industry is not always immediately intuitive.\textsuperscript{11} At first glance it may seem obvious that, since the SMI is defined by the social movement, one might include any organization working toward change in that area. However, the real problem lies in defining what “working for change in an area” means and, on top of this, finding data sources on such organizations. Nonetheless, there are some exemplars in the literature.

The classic study of SMIs was conducted by Minkoff (1993, 1994, 1995, 1997, 1999), and examined all U.S. organizations listed in the \textit{Encyclopedia of Associations} associated with Women’s and Race and Ethnic Civil Rights. While this strategy allowed Minkoff to identify organizations working toward change associated with a variety of different social movements, coding these national-level directories provided information on only those organizations that self-report to the Gale Research Company (after being identified by Gale staff or requesting inclusion). As such, certain organizations may be underrepresented, particularly protest organizations (Minkoff 1999, p. 1678; Minkoff 2002, p. 267). Nonetheless, Minkoff’s clever research design has been replicated by others. For example, Smith (1997, 2002, 2005) uses the \textit{Yearbook of International Associations} to collect data on transnational social movement organizations associated with nearly 40 different SMIs. Others, such as Brulle (2000), Andrews and Edwards (2005), Kempton et al. (2001), Edwards and Foley (2003), and Edwards and Marullo (1995) have used various organizational directories in combination with

\textsuperscript{11} This problem is akin to problems faced by organizations scholars who grapple with how to define organizational populations, fields, and industries (Hannan and Freeman 1989) or with how political sociologists, more generally, define policy domains (Laumann and Knoke 1987).
surveys, in-depth interviews, and Internal Revenue Service documentation, to collect data on organizations within a single SMI (often in a limited geographical area or two).

Aside from relying on organizational directories, scholars have used a variety of other archival-based sources. For example, McCarthy et al. (1988) used chapter rosters of national organizations to obtain data on state and local organizations in a single industry (anti-drunk driving). And, Fernandez and McAdam (1988) used applications to the Freedom Summer Project to identify SMOs associated with the New Left movement industry in two different campus communities (Madison and Berkeley). Finally, Rosenthal, Fingrutd, Ehtier, Karant, and McDonald (1988) used biographical profiles of prominent women reformers in New York State to track organizations active in a variety of different SMIs in the nineteenth century.

In this paper, we employ a different strategy. Specifically, we build on the strategy used by Everett (1992) and Bearman and Everett (1993) to, in their case, operationally define the social movement sector. We argue that a social movement industry is comprised of all organizations that participate in public, protest events, associated with the same general change goal (e.g., peace, women, or environment) as reported in newspaper accounts of protest events in a given area of the country. Participation in a protest event can mean anything from sponsoring (or cosponsoring) the event, to organizing the event, to providing participants and resources to the event. The essential issue is that the organization is explicitly named as somehow facilitating the execution of the protest event. This approach uses information on what organizations do (e.g., participate in public protest events) to define them as part of the SMI, rather than using pre-existing directories of organizations, activist accounts,
or activist biographic profiles. Specifically, by collecting data on all public protest events associated with a particular set of SMIs and determining the names of organizations participating in these events, we are able to define the organizations that make up each SMI based on the fact that they have been named as participating in these events.

There are three important issues to note about this operational definition. First, as should be clear, we define social movement organizations based on one key function of such organizations: participation in public protest events. To be sure, social movement organizations perform many other functions (e.g., lobbying, litigation, counseling, teaching). But, we argue that one key function of social movement organizations is public, protest thus we use this as our criteria for including an organization in the SMI.

Second, it is important to note that by defining the SMI in this way, we include organizations that are not what we might typically define as a “social movement organization.” For example, churches and their members often participate in public, protest events, however we would not necessarily consider churches to be “social movement organizations.” By defining the sector as comprised of all organizations that participate in public, protest events, we release ourselves from the bounds of essentialist definitions. Note,

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12 Note that we are not criticizing these other data sources, rather we are offering an alternative way operationally define the SMI.

13 This is consistent with Tilly (2004) who maintains that this repertoire of tactics (e.g., marches, rallies, demonstrations) is a primary feature that distinguishes social movements from other forms of contentious politics. But note that our definition excludes organizations that choose not to participate in public, collective action events.
however, that for simplicity and ease of interpretation, we will continue to use the acronym “SMO” to refer to the organizations we study.

Finally, defining the SMI in this way also offers a different way to classify organizations into the appropriate industry, based on the issue around which they are protesting and the year in which they do so. For example, “Women Strike for Peace” appears in our data at close to 50 protest events surrounding the Peace Movement (spanning 1961-1975) and in 2 protest events surrounding the Women’s Movement (1967-1971). However, this organization was not listed at all under Peace or Women’s associations in the Encyclopedia of Association in some years that it participated in protest (e.g., 1961), although it is listed in subsequent years.¹⁴

Data Source

As noted above, like Everett (1992) and Bearman and Everett (1993), we collect data on organizations active in protest in three different SMIs from newspaper reports of protest events. These data are collected from daily editions of the New York Times (NYT) as part of a larger research project initiated by Doug McAdam, John McCarthy, Susan Olzak, and Sarah Soule (see McAdam and Su 2002; Earl, Soule, and McCarthy 2003; Van Dyke, Soule, and Taylor 2004; Soule and Earl 2005; and Earl and Soule 2006 for descriptions of the larger project). While the broader database includes protest events that happened all over the country from 1960-1986, we limit our analysis to events that occurred anywhere in the state of New

¹⁴ In a small number of cases (such as “Women Strike for Peace”), an organization participated in events that took place in the different industries in the same year. In such cases, we classified the organization in the industry in which the majority of its events took place.
York between 1960 and 1986. We limit the analysis to a single state for two reasons. First, the NYT’s coverage of local protests is more complete than its coverage of national protests (Earl, Martin, McCarthy, and Soule 2004; Swank 2000; Davenport and Ball 2002; Oliver and Maney 2000; Oliver and Myers 1999; McCarthy, McPhail and Smith 1996). Second, limiting our analysis to New York is also in line with organizational demography, which sees resource niches as being geographically heterogeneous (Hannan and Freeman 1989; Freeman and Audia 2006), and follows previous resource partitioning studies in analyzing a geographically-specific industry (e.g. Carroll 1985).

In order to be included in our analysis, events also had to meet several other criteria: 1) more than one person had to participate in an event since our concern is with collective action; 2) participants must have articulated a claim associated with the Women’s Movement or the Environmental Movement, or the Peace Movement; 3) the event must have happened in the public sphere; and 4) the event must have had at least one organization named as present. While most of our events targeted the some level of state government, events could target private entities (e.g., corporations, religious organizations) or the broader public (see description of targets in Van Dyke, Soule, and Taylor 2004). As noted above, from these events in New York state, we code participating organizations (see Figure 1 below).

Newspaper data on collective action events is one of the most frequently used forms of data in the field of social movements and the field has learned a great deal from studies employing newspaper data (see Earl et al. 2004 for a review). In fact, McAdam and Su (2002, p. 704) note that the analysis of protest event data culled from newspapers is a “methodological staple” in social movement studies and that many of the “classical empirical works in the field” use newspaper data. Because of the popularity of newspaper data on collective action
events, there have been many attempts to assess the potential biases associated with this source (see recent comprehensive reviews in Earl et al. 2004; Ortiz et al. 2005). In particular, studies have asserted that there are two main sources of bias in newspaper data: selection bias and description bias. Selection bias refers to the fact that not all protest events will be covered by a given newspaper and the possibility that what is covered is not a random sample of all events that took place and that selection bias may vary over time (Mueller 1997). Description bias refers to the veracity of the coverage of events that are selected for coverage. In their extensive review of the literature, Earl et al. (2004) conclude that the type of event, location of event, and issue involved all impact the selection of events that will be covered, but that the “hard facts” of the event are generally accurately covered by newspapers.

The data collection design used in our research attempted to deal with some of these potential biases of newspaper data. First, as we note above, we examine only events (and organizations) in New York state, since we are using the New York Times as a data source. This strategy reduces selection bias due to geography of the event (Earl, Martin, McCarthy, and Soule 2004; Swank 2000; Davenport and Ball 2002; Oliver and Maney 2000; Oliver and Myers 1999; McCarthy, McPhail and Smith 1996). Second, unlike many prior studies using newspapers as a source of data on collective action events, we did not use an index of the NYT to identify events nor did we sample days of the newspaper. Instead, we skimmed daily editions of the newspaper and identified all protest events that were reported.15 This strategy also reduces selection bias, by not introducing further sources of selection (in this case, researcher-induced or indexing procedure-induced). Finally, because for this paper we draw

15 Researcher assistants then content coded these events, achieving inter-coder reliability rates that were consistently at or above 90% agreement.
on “hard facts” of the events (as will be described in detail below, we use data on tactics used, goals, articulated, organizations present, and policing), and not on “soft facts” (such as opinions on the issue), we are confident that the accuracy of our data is acceptable.

Despite our measures taken to reduce bias, critics will likely fault our use of newspaper data on protesting organizations. We ask that such critics consider the alternatives, as we describe above, and note that virtually all other alternative sources for data on protesting organizations (or SMOs) come with their own biases. For example, directories tend to over-report larger, more established organizations and tend to under-report protest organizations (Minkoff 2002) and Internal Revenue Service records exist only for those organizations filing with this organization (Brulle 2000).\(^{16}\) Fundamentally, to adequately assess the extent of the bias with any of these data sources, one would need a separate data source on the entire population of all protesting organizations -- something which simply does not exist.\(^{17}\) Thus, we ask critics to accept our data source, knowing that it (like other sources) likely has some bias, which we have attempted to reduce to the best of our ability.

\(^{16}\) As a reliability check, we cross-referenced our list of protesting organizations in these three SMIIs with those listed in the *Encyclopedia of Association* for a random set of years. Overlap ranged from 56-79\%, depending on the industry and the year. Interestingly, one of the things that this cross-check showed us is that Minkoff (2002) is correct: the *Encyclopedia* tends to underreport local organizations and protest organizations.

\(^{17}\) One potentially exciting way to obtain a random sample of protest organizations would be to ask a random sample of individuals to name such organizations with which they are affiliated. According to hypernetwork sampling techniques (McPherson 1982; Chaves et al. 1999), doing so would provide a random sample of such organizations.
Dependent Variables

From this record of all protest organizations active at New York state protest events reported in the *New York Times* between 1960-1986, we are able to define several dependent variables. First, using information on the array of tactics and goals used each year by each SMO in these three SMIs, we develop two dependent variables that are used in the analysis below. The first dependent variable is the level of “tactical specialization”, \( L_{ts} \). To compute this, we first divided the number of tactics used by an organization (in a year) by the total number of tactics used by all organizations in the SMI in that year. Then, we took the inverse of this value:

\[
L_{ts} = \left( \frac{N_{ORG}}{N_{TOT}} \right)^{-1}
\]

\( N_{ORG} \) is calculated with the following equation:

\[
N_{ORG} = \sum_{i=1}^{N_{TOT}} c_{iORG}
\]

where \( c_{iORG} \) is 0 if organization \( ORG \) did not use tactic \( i \) and 1 if it did. (Appendix A lists all of the tactics used by SMOs in the U.S. in the 1960-1986 period).

The second dependent variable is the organization’s level of “goal specialization”, or \( L_{gs} \). To compute this, we first divided the number of goals articulated by an organization (in a given year) by the total number of goals articulated by all organizations in the SMI in that year. Then, we took the inverse of this value, as we did above for tactical specialization:

\[
18 \text{ Note that in our second analysis on organizational survival, these first two dependent variables (tactical and goal specialization) are used as independent variables predicting the organization’s chance of survival.}
\]
\[ L_{gs} = (N_{\text{ORG}} / N_{\text{TOT}})^{-1} \]

\(N_{\text{ORG}}\) is calculated with the following equation:

\[ N_{\text{ORG}} = \sum_{i=1}^{N_{\text{TOT}}} c_{i\text{ORG}} \]

where \(c_{i\text{ORG}}\) is 0 if organization \(\text{ORG}\) did not use claim \(i\) and 1 if it did.\(^{19}\) (Appendix B lists all of the claims articulated by organizations associated with the U.S. Women’s, Peace, and Environmental Movements, as reported in the NYT, in the 1960-1986 period).

Following our analysis of protest organizations’ tactical and goal specialization, we are interested in understanding how an organization’s level of specialization, net of and in combination with SMI competition and concentration, impacts its persistence as a protest organization. In other words, we use our dependent variables (tactical and goal specialization) as explanatory variables for organizational survival. For this analysis, we assume that if an organization is reported as participating at an event in \(\text{time}_1\), but then never appears again in newspaper reports, it has not survived beyond \(\text{time}_1\) (at least as a protest organization, since it was not protesting beyond \(\text{time}_1\)). For our purposes, this organization no longer persists in the population of protesting organizations. If an organization appears time and time again at events, we assume that it has survived as a protest organization, at least between each

\(^{19}\) Note that our measures of goal and tactical specialization treat the differences between each different tactic or goal as equal. Future research might expand on our approach by devising more nuanced ways to differentiate tactics and goals.
appearance in our record. This dependent variable, then, is a dummy variable for each organization for each year, coded 0 if it is engaging in protest in that year and 1 for the first year in which the organization fails to engage in some kind of protest. For example, if an organization participates in an event in 1967, 1980, and 1985, we code 1986 as “1”, since it no longer protested beyond 1985. (See Appendix C for some concrete examples.)

It might be argued that if an organization did not participate in protests for a long period of time, it has not really survived. We argue the contrary. As observed by Taylor (1989), SMOs often undergo periods of abeyance in order to maintain the survival of the movement. What distinguishes survival or persistence here is the crucial fact that an SMO was able to reorganize its membership in order to protest once again. Although there may be some slippage in our operationalization of SMO survival, we believe this variable captures as accurately as possible the extent to which an SMO maintains its structure in order to survive to protest another day.

This mirrors Minkoff’s (1993, 1994, 1995, 1997, 1999) strategy of inferring organizational survival by inclusion in the Encyclopedia of Association. Similarly, like Minkoff, this dependent variable is technically the rate of organizational failure to protest, since we code this as 1 when the organization no longer protests (see Minkoff 1993, p. 899).

Note that this implies that an organization can survive as an organization, but cease to participate in public, protest events. That is, if an organization changes strategies and decides not to participate in or sponsor protest events, for our purposes it has failed as a protest organization. Note that this operationalization of survival is similar to the study designs of other ecological analyses (e.g., Rao 1994; Zaheer and Mosakowski 1997; Carroll and Swaminathan 2000).
Thus, a positive coefficient on a given term indicates that this variable increases the organization’s failure to exist as a protest organization/failure to protest.

*Independent Variables: Organizational Tactical and Goal Specialization*

Our hypotheses about how SMI-level factors impact individual organizations’ level of tactical and goal specialization necessitate the measurement of two key concepts: organizational density (i.e. industry size) and concentration. To measure density, we constructed a yearly count of the number of organizations active in protest associated with each of the three SMIs. Figure 1 shows the yearly size (or density) of the three SMIs. In the models below, we also include a measure of density-squared to test for the second order effects of competition on organizational specialization.

It is reasonable to ask whether or not the patterns of industry size depicted in Figure 1 are similar to other attempts at describing these three social movement industries. However, since we focus on protest organizations in New York during this period, there really is not another source to which we can compare our figures directly. As Brulle (2000, p. 101) notes (with respect to the environmental movement industry), “The size of the U.S. environmental movement has never been measured accurately. There is little or no agreement on what constitutes a ‘movement’ organization, or on where the boundaries between the environmental movement and related movements (for example, animal rights) should be drawn.” Thus, comparing our data to that of others is a bit like comparing apples to oranges.21

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21 For example, Edwards and Marullo (1995) and Edwards and Foley (2003) report substantially more peace organizations in the 1980s than we have. But, it is critical to note
To measure SMI-level concentration, we use the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), which is a standard measure of market concentration. It is computed by summing the squared market shares of each firm competing in an industry.

\[ HHI = s_1^2 + s_2^2 + s_3^2 + \ldots + s_n^2 \]

Where \( s_i \) is the market share of the \( i^{th} \) firm, and \( n \) is the total number of firms in the industry.\(^{22}\)

In our case, rather than market share, we use “protest share”, which is computed yearly for each organization and is simply the number of protest events that the organization took part in that the data on which these authors rely cover far more than protest organizations (i.e., their data include informal friendship groups and virtually any group working toward peace, not merely those that took part in protest events) and, of course, these authors examined all such organizations in the entire U.S. (Edwards and Marullo 1995, p. 911). Similarly, Andrews and Edwards (2005) report on 738 environmental organizations in North Carolina and Kempton et al. (2001) find 566 local environmental organizations in North Carolina and the Delmarva Peninsula. Although both of these studies show more environmental organizations than we have identified, it is critical to note that these studies also include more than protest organizations and are conducted after the end of our period. Nonetheless, it is important to note that the post-1970 increase in the density of women’s protest organizations in New York mirrors a similar increase in the density of women’s advocacy, cultural, service, and protest organizations at the national level shown by Minkoff (1995, p. 62).

\(^{22}\) In models not shown, we construct an index of tactical overlap based on the procedures outlined by Olzak and Uhrig (2001, p. 704) in an effort to provide a third conceptualization of competition (in addition to density and concentration). Our index was fairly highly correlated with density (.80) and produced the same results as those presented herein.
that year divided by the total number of protest events that took place that year in the organization’s industry (Peace, Women’s, Environment).23

In models in which we include this SMI concentration measure, we also include the “protest share” variable to test for the argument that larger, more active organizations are less likely to specialize. RPT, as noted above, predicts that newer, less well-established organizations will be the ones to specialize. While our measure of “protest share” is not a measure of age, it is a measure of level of activity, thus might reasonably be seen as a proxy for level of establishment and, perhaps, age.

We also include a dummy variable that is coded “1” when an organization’s protest share is greater than the mean protest share of all organizations in a given year, in the particular industry in which the organization is located.

Finally, we include an interaction term designed to test whether or not incumbent organizations in highly concentrated industries are less likely to specialize. According to resource partitioning theory, older, more established organizations are more likely to be generalists and are more likely to be located closer to the center of the market, while newer,

23 For example, in 1967, Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) was present at 15 different Peace Movement protest events. That year, there were 116 events associated with the Peace SMI, thus SDS’ “protest share” for 1967 was .1293103. Another way to think about this is to say that SDS was present at 12.93% of all Peace Movement events that took place in 1967 in New York. This can be contrasted with Veterans for Peace who, in 1967, were present at only 2 of the 116 events (thus, had a protest share of .0172414 for 1967). After computing the protest share for each organization, each year, by industry, we summed the squared values of these to compute the HHI, as described above.
less established organizations are more likely to be specialists located on the fringes of the market. Thus, we expect to find a negative effect of this interaction term on the level of specialization. That is to say that the negative effect of incumbency (main effect) on tactical and goal specialization will be amplified under conditions of high concentration.

*Independent Variables: Organizational Survival*

In our analysis of SMO survival, much like our analysis of organizational specialization, we are interested in understanding how industry-level dynamics of concentration and competition affect an organization’s chances of survival as a protest organization. Thus, we include our yearly measures of competition and concentration as described above. However, we are also interested in understanding how an organization’s level of tactical and goal specialization affects its chances of survival. Thus, we also include our measures of organizational-level tactical and goal specialization described above (in other words, our two dependent variables from our first analysis become independent variables in our analysis of organizational survival).

The most important measures in our analysis of organizational survival or persistence, however, are two different interaction terms that we construct to test arguments about RPT. First, we include a statistical interaction term for the level of SMI concentration and the organization’s level of tactical specialization to test the argument that tactical specialists have better chances of persistence when the industry is highly concentrated. Second, we include an interaction term for the level of SMI concentration and the organization’s level of goal specialization, arguing that goal specialists in highly concentrated industries have survival advantages as well.
Independent Variables: Both Analyses

In all models presented below, we include two measures designed to control for the level of resources in the environment (McCarthy and Zald 1977), since RMT argues that SMO processes are highly dependent on the availability of resources that can be channeled into the movement. First, we include a yearly measure of the personal disposable income in New York (logged) to control for the amount of discretionary monetary resources that individuals may have to contribute to a SMO. Second, we include a yearly measure of the business failure rate to control for upswings and downswings in the New York economy; this measure is the number of business failures in New York (logged).24

In addition to these two resource measures, we include a measure of how repressive the police were in a particular year, in a particular industry to control for the possibility that state response to protesters may affect both tactical and goal innovation (McAdam 1983) and organizational survival (Zald and McCarthy 1980). To control for this, we include the percentage of all events in New York (in a given year) in each SMI that were met with police

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24 An ideal measure of resources available to protest organizations would be foundation and elite philanthropic funding to these organizations (McCarthy 2004; Jenkins 1998; Jenkins and Eckert 1986). Unfortunately such data do not exist for the organizations in our study over this time period. But, as a robustness check, we examined the correlations of our measures with yearly, national-level, funding figures to the three movements in our study for the 1960-1980 period (data provided by Craig Jenkins). Our measures were highly correlated with his measures for the years these data were available.
response. Data on police response were drawn directly from the newspaper reports of protest events, as described above.25

Finally, in all models included in the two tables below, we include dummy variables for two of the three SMIs (Peace and Women) and dummy variables for two of the three decades in our analysis (1960s and 1970s) to account for unmeasured temporal and industry heterogeneity (e.g., omitted variable bias).

Note that in models not shown, we experimented with a variety of other measures designed to get at the Political Opportunity Structure (POS): % Democrats in Congress, % Women in Congress, Democratic President, number of “call-ups” to military service, Conservative Coalition Victories in the House and Senate, % if the Federal budget that was spent on the environment, and % of the Federal budget that was spent on the military. None of these variables was significant in models run, thus we do not include in models presented below, but we do discuss this lack of significance in our Discussion and Conclusion section below.

Estimation Techniques: Organizational Tactical and Goal Specialization

Because our data are arrayed as organizations-years in a cross-sectional, time series format, and there was evidence of first-order autocorrelation, Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression is inappropriate for our purposes. Thus, we use Generalized Least Squares (GLS)

25 This follows the lead of many scholars of protest policing who rely on data from newspapers [for some examples and reviews, see contributions in Della Porta and Reiter (1998)]. Nonetheless, it should be noted that news accounts of police behavior may be biased (Earl et al. 2004).
regression to estimate the effects of industry-level effects on the first two dependent variables (tactical and goal specialization). The GLS model, in its most simple form, is represented as:

\[ Y_t = a + bX_t + e_t \]

Where \( Y_t \) is the outcome on interest measured at time, \( t \), and \( X_t \) is the explanatory variable measured at time, \( t \), \( e_t \) is the random error term, and \( a \) and \( b \) are unknown parameters (Ostrom 1990, p. 14). Models presented below are estimated using the XTGLS command in Stata (Version 8), which uses feasibility generalized least squares to estimate cross sectional time series models.

A common problem in this type of data structure is autocorrelation, or the fact that yearly observations for the same SMO will tend to be correlated. XTLGLS allows a number of different choices for the working correlation matrix and we experimented with all of these. We found that the models fit best when we specified first order serial autocorrelation (ar1).

**Estimation Techniques: Organizational Survival**

The dependent variable in our analysis of organizational survival is a yearly, dichotomous variable coded “1” for the year after an organization no longer protests. We use logistic regression to perform an event-history analysis of organizational persistence. This model is nonlinear and is expressed as:

\[ P = \frac{\exp(x_j \beta)}{1 + \exp(x_j \beta)}, \]

where \( P \) = the probability of survival, \( x \) is the set of covariates, and \( \beta \) is the set of coefficients (including the constant). However since our data are panel data, we use the XTLOGIT command in Stata (Version 8) to obtain random effects estimates.
Results

Organizational Tactical and Goal Specialization

Table 1 presents the results of models predicting the level of specialization by a particular SMO in three different industries. Models 1 and 3 include only our control variables, and Models 2 and 4 include our controls plus our measures designed to tap RMT and RPT. Models 2 and 4 show that as density in the SMI increases, organizational levels of tactical and goal specialization also increase. That is, consistent with McCarthy and Zald’s (1977) hypotheses, industry-level competition increases the narrowness of tactics and goals offered by social movement organizations. These models also include the quadratic term for industry density and the coefficient (in both models) is negative.26

Models 2 and 4 also test for the effects of industry concentration on organizations’ levels of tactical and goal specialization. In both models, the protest share of a particular organization decreases the level of specialization, as expected. Recall that this measure taps how active a particular organization is in the industry in a particular year, thus these findings indicate that more active organizations are less likely to specialize. We have argued above that these organizations are likely more established organizations. As such, this finding indicates that the more established an organization is, the less likely it is to specialize with respect to its tactics and goals. Related, the incumbency measure (as expected and as consistent with the effect of the protest share measure) is also negative and significant. These findings follow the

26 Note that in models not shown, we run all models presented in Table 1 by industry. These models produced very similar results, indicating that the effects we report in Table 1 hold up within industry as well as across industry.
expectation of resource partitioning theory that larger, established organizations are more likely to become generalists because their size allows them to perform more operations for a lower cost than similarly motivated, but less established organizations.

The last measure included in Models 2 and 4 in Table 1 is the statistical interaction term for incumbency and concentration. As expected, the effect of this measure is negative and significant, indicating that the negative effect of incumbency on specialization is amplified when industry concentration is high. That is, more established (incumbent) organizations in an industry are, in general, less likely to specialize and this is especially true when the SMI is more highly concentrated. This finding is consistent with the RPT, which argues that in highly concentrated industries, it is the newer and less established organizations that specialize – not the incumbents.

Finally, with respect to the control variables, across all models the logged number of business failures decreases the level of specialization. This finding indicates that when resources are prevalent, there is likely to be more specialization of both tactics and goals. These findings run counter to what we expected based on RMT, which argues that when resources are more plentiful, organizations are more likely be generalists, relying on a variety of different tactics and expanding their goals to include more people. Instead, we find that when economic conditions are better, organizations are more likely to specialize.

One explanation for this unexpected finding is that generalist organizations, due to their economies of scale, can operate more cost-effectively during times of general economic hardship than smaller specialists. During recessions, for example, when activists and donors have fewer resources to spread around, specialist SMOs are at a particular disadvantage. As mentioned in the theory section above, the primary advantage that specialists have over
generalists is not effectiveness or tactical competence; rather it is their appeal to a particular movement identity. But supporter identity may be more or less tractable, depending on the scarcity of expendable resources.

One mechanism might be that activists and donors are simply more discriminate of their resource use during economic downturns, which leads them to support generalist organizations that have proven track records and which may spread their influence and activities more broadly. Conversely, during economic prosperity, donors may be more likely to give to specialized movement organizations, leading to the unanticipated positive relationship between resources and organizational specialization that we report in Table 1. During economic contraction, specialists, which are typically smaller and unable to quickly adapt to the changing economic conditions, may be more likely to lose out in the competition for scarce mobilizing resources. Specialist organizations, then, are most likely to abound during times of plenty, while generalists are better suited for times of scarcity. In the following analysis, we are able to test this argument (see Table 2 below). As discussed below, our findings support this interpretation of the mechanism behind the counterintuitive finding that resources increase SMO specialization.

Organizational Survival

Turning now to Table 2, none of the control variables significantly altered the persistence or survival of protest organizations.

[Table 2 About Here]

Across all four models in Table 2, we find the expected non-linear effect of density on persistence of protest organizations, indicating that legitimacy of the SMI improves survival
chances. However, as the negative sign on the squared term indicates, at very high levels of density, the protective effect of legitimacy wanes and competitive pressures kick in.

In Model 1 of Table 2, we show the effect of tactical specialization on survival chances of organizations in these three SMIs in New York. As expected, we show that tactical specialists were more likely to cease protesting -- the coefficient is positive and significant. However, when we include our interaction of organizational specialization with SMI concentration (HHI), we see that specialist SMOs in highly concentrated industries are more likely to persist (as predicted by RPT).

In Model 2, we show that SMOs with highly specialized goals also were more likely to fail to protest, as indicated by the positive and significant coefficient. However, as was the case with tactical specialization, we show that organizations with specialized goals in highly concentrated industries are less likely to fail to protest.\(^{27}\) Thus, SMI concentration not only affects specialization levels of protest organizations as we showed in Table 1 above, but it also conditions the probability that these specialist organizations will continue to exist as protesting organizations. These findings, combined, confirm that specialist organizations have survival advantages in highly concentrated industries.

In addition to testing the RPT hypotheses about SMO survival, we decided to further investigate the implications of the findings reported in Table 1. Recall that, contrary to what we expected based on resource mobilization theory, we found that resource scarcity in the environment led to lower levels of organizational-level specialization. We suspect that this

\(^{27}\) As was the case for the models presented in Table 1, we ran these analyses by each industry to ensure that there are no industry differences. The results were similar in each industry, confirming our expectations.
finding reflects the economies of scale that enable large, generalist organizations to operate more cost-effectively during economic downturns. Therefore, generalist organizations should be better fit for times of resource scarcity. If this is what is happening, specialist organizations should have lower rates of survival when general resource levels are low.

We test this by including in Models 3 and 4 of Table 2 a statistical interaction between disposable income and specialization of the protest organization. In order to reduce collinearity, a common problem when including statistical interactions (Jaccard, Turrisi, Wan 1990), we centered the two variables on their mean and created a product of the two centered variables to assess the interaction effect (as suggested by Jaccard et al. 1990). In Model 3, we show that the product of disposable income and tactical specialization is negative and statistically significant at the .05 level. The negative interaction indicates that as disposable income increases, the main effect of tactical specialization on failure decreases. This finding supports the explanation that specialist organizations appear to be less suited for survival in an environment where resources are scarce. This generalization, however, only applies to tactical specialization. In Model 4, we see that the interaction effect of disposable income and goal specialization is smaller and is not statistically significant. Therefore, it appears that if cost advantages in economically turbulent environments go to generalist SMOs, this is only the case when the SMO chooses to diversify its tactics. SMOs that have a diverse body of goals do not appear to similarly advantaged.

**Discussion and Conclusions**

We began this paper by noting that social movement industries are rarely unified affairs. Instead, they are typically characterized by many different organizations pursuing
related, but subtly different, goals and drawing on different sets of tactics. Building on insights from RMT and RPT, we argued for explicit attention to how industry-level characteristics of density and concentration affect organizational-level specialization and how this, in turn, impacts organizational persistence as a protest organization.

There are several key findings commensurate with what resource mobilization and resource partitioning theories would predict. First, inter-organizational competition increases the level of specialization of protest organizations. Second, more established protest organizations are more likely to adopt generalist tactics and espouse more general goals. Third, while industry concentration tends to lead protest organizations to specialize, more established organizations are less likely to specialize under industry concentration. Fourth, organizational specialization decreases an organization’s chances of survival, unless specialization occurs in highly concentrated industries; in which case, an organization’s chances of survival are heightened by adopting a more specialized repertoire of tactics and goals.

Contrary to what resource mobilization theory predicts, we found that when resources (i.e., disposable income) were low, protest organizations were less likely to specialize. We suggested that the reason for this is that generalist organizations actually have a cost-advantage because they are larger and have organizational structures set up for dealing with a variety of environmental contingencies. Thus, in resource-scarce environments, generalists have a survival advantage over specialists. This supposition was confirmed in the analyses that showed that specialist SMOs were more likely to cease protesting when resources were scarce.

This research makes several contributions to the study of social movements. First, in part because of the use of case studies of individual movements or movement organizations,
macro-organizational analysis of social movements “remains relatively underdeveloped” (Minkoff 2002, p. 260). In moving the level of analysis from the individual movement or movement organization to the SMI, our analysis allows for a deeper understanding of the effects of inter-organizational dynamics on organizational processes. As such, this helps to answer a call by McAdam and Scott (2005) for researchers to pay more attention to organizational environments and inter-organizational dynamics. That is, by testing hypotheses developed at the inter-organizational level that are sensitive to the organizational environment, we are able to assess how social movement industry-level dynamics impact two important organizational outcomes: tactical and goal specialization and organizational survival. Combined with our research decision to examine these processes across three different SMIs (which allows us confidence that our results are likely not an artifact of a particular social movement), our findings contribute to the development of theory at the intersection of social movement and organizational studies (e.g., McAdam and Scott 2005).

Second, this research is an important empirical contribution to the study of the influence of resource availability and competition and SMO structuration. Despite the centrality of resource competition in the original formulation of RMT by McCarthy and Zald (1977), few scholars have examined its implications thoroughly. Competition, while an important dynamic of most organizational research, has largely been left out of analyses of protest organizations.

Third, we enrich RMT by drawing upon RPT, but the benefits of this synthesis are not simply unidirectional. Our findings suggest that resource partitioning theory is able to offer a more nuanced understanding of the dynamics of organizational specialization when combined with resource mobilization theory. While RPT looks exclusively at the dynamics of intra-
industry competition, we expanded our analysis to also include the effects of general resource scarcity, per resource mobilization theory. In so doing, we find that generalist organizations have survival advantages over specialists in scarce resource environments. This finding suggests that social movement and organizational scholars should consider the influence of the broader environmental resource base (in addition to niche-specific resources) on specialization.

Had we focused solely on RMT (as most social movement scholars have), we would have concluded that inter-organizational competition (measured by density) leads organizations to specialize, but that this strategy ironically leads to organizational failure. By adding RPT, we can qualify these findings by saying that SMI concentration (rather than density) creates the conditions where specialist organizations may survive and flourish. Thus, our analysis leads to a more nuanced view of the effects of specialization on survival. In some instances, specialization may be a liability to survival, while under other environmental conditions, specialization enhances survival.

Fourth, one might reasonably ask how our findings on tactical specialization articulate on a substantive level with past research on tactical innovation (McAdam 1983; McCammon 2003). We think that there are two primary differences. First, past research on tactical innovation has been chiefly concerned with explaining how specific organizations innovate with respect to specific tactical choices, when faced with external constraints (e.g., state repression, counter-movements, etc) and how innovating can increase chances of viability of the organization. Rather than focus on specific tactics, we focus on the more general strategy of specializing. In other words, we are concerned with repertoire size (relative to the repertoire size of other organizations in the same industry). Second, while past research (e.g.,
McAdam (1983) has focused on how external factors affect organizations, we expand on this by examining how inter-organizational competition and industry competition affect organizational outcomes. Interestingly, if we were to combine insights from this past research with our own insights, we might conclude that tactical innovation can lead to organizational survival, but it is best to not drop tactics used in the past, since (according to our findings), generalists have survival advantages (unless the SMI is highly concentrated).

In addition, our findings have more general implications regarding the long-term viability of SMIs. The inter-organizational dynamics of competition observed here, while sometimes decreasing survival of any single SMO, may actually enhance the survivability of the industry. The findings suggest that specialists and generalists are interdependent, and together create a lively protest industry addressing a wide variety of goals and tactics that bring in participants and donors that might be ignored under a more centralized system of authority. Unlike other studies of innovation, then, which suggest that individual SMOs adapt to success and failures or external threats from their environment, our findings indicate that the SMI also adapts as some SMOs fail to survive and resources are reshuffled between specialists and generalists.

It seems reasonable to conclude with some suggestions for future research. First, at the outset, we noted two different levels of specialization – that at the organizational level and that at the industry level. We also noted that a key difference between our analysis and the analyses of most resource partitioning studies in organizational studies is that we have examined the level of tactical and goal specialization of individual organizations, while most resource partitioning studies examine the mix of organizations at the population level. Clearly, studying the effects of industry-level factors on particular organizational attributes (e.g.
specialization) is the next step in this line of research and one that is being advanced quite elegantly by Olzak and Ryo (2004).

Second, we call on other researchers to devise alternative and creative ways to operationally define the social movement industry. We have followed Everett (1992), and defined the SMI as all organizations that took part in public protest events associated with three different industries. As such, we have defined inclusion in the SMI based on what organizations do. However, there are likely many other ways to define the SMI and we call for researchers to think seriously about how this may be done in an effort to ascertain if our findings regarding the importance of industry-level dynamics hold when the SMI is defined differently. As noted above, scholars have used directories of associations (sometimes in combination with surveys and interviews) and archival materials to define SMIs. We have added to this repertoire of data sources by using accounts of protest events. As described in an earlier note, one potentially useful method would be to ask questions about names of organizations to which individuals belong on a nationally representative survey (e.g., General Social Survey). By using hypernetwork techniques (McPherson 1982; Chaves et al. 1999), one could create a nationally representative sample of organizations associated with a particular SMI or the entire SMS.

Third, we call for research that considers additional types of organizational outcomes (rather than tactical and goal specialization) and how industry-level dynamics may impact such outcomes. For example, research could examine how industry competition and concentration impact levels of protest. Future research should consider how industry-level dynamics (net of and in combination with resources) impacts other kinds of organizational outcomes.
Fourth, a fruitful area of inquiry will be to examine how ecological dynamics affect social movement frames. Benford (1993) examines how competition and conflicts within an SMI can arise over frames (in his terms, “frame disputes”). It would be interesting to examine how ecological dynamics affect framing processes, for example how does competition affect the level of specialization of a particular frame articulated by a movement organization? Examining specialization of frames is important, since frame specialization has been linked to successful outcomes of SMOs (Cress and Snow 2000).

Fifth, in our models we included a number of measures designed to tap dimensions of the Political Opportunity Structure (POS), suggesting that perhaps these dimensions might have an independent effect on organizational specialization and/or persistence. As we noted above, none of the coefficients on these measures were significant, casting doubt on the idea that the POS impacts organizational specialization and or persistence in these three SMIs. This may not be especially surprising, since the literature on the POS does not claim that the dimensions of the POS should necessarily affect organizational specialization or persistence. However, the POS is a compelling concept and one that has proven to be quite useful in explaining the emergence and outcomes of social movements. Thus, we would encourage future researchers to attend to this concept when examining organizational dynamics if for no other reason than to build on our lack of findings in this study.

Sixth, we chose to examine the three SMIs that we did because all three were subject to industry-level analyses in the past and were interesting in seeing how previous findings resonated with our own. But, it is important to now extend these analyses to other SMIs to see if the dynamics we uncovered are at work in other industries, in other countries, and in other eras.
Finally, we conclude with a very broad call for more research in the nexus of social movements and organizational theories. Here, we have attempted to bring organizational theories to bear on social movement processes and have shown these theories to add to what we know about the factors affecting tactical and goal specialization. However, future research should also consider ways in which social movement theories can help explain organizational phenomena. Research that crosses the boundaries between these two subdisciplines promises to teach us a great deal about both movements and organizations (McAdam and Scott 2005).
References


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Chaves, Mark, Mary Ellen Konieczny, Kraig Beyerlein and Emily Barman. 1999. AThe national congregation study: Background, methods and selected results.@ *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 38:458-76.


*Sociological Forum* 3(3):357-382.


Women’s Reform in New York State“. American Journal of Sociology 90(5): 1022-1054.


Table 1. GLS Regression Models of Level of Tactical and Goal Specialization of Social Movement Organizations in Peace, Women’s, and Environmental Movements in New York, 1960-1986 (Standard Errors in Parentheses)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1 Tactical</th>
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<th>Model 3 Goal</th>
<th>Model 4 Goal</th>
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<td>.04</td>
<td>.08</td>
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<td>(.03)</td>
<td>(.05)</td>
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<td>-.03*</td>
<td>-.03*</td>
<td>-.04***</td>
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<td>(.01)</td>
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<td>.0002</td>
<td>.0009</td>
</tr>
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<td>(.001)</td>
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<td>(.0007)</td>
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<td>(.03)</td>
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<td>.05</td>
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<td>(.01)</td>
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<td></td>
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Notes: * 1523 cases, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 (two-tailed test)
Table 2: Random Effects Logistic Regression Model of Protest Organization Failure in the New York Peace, Women’s, and Environmental Movements, 1960-1986 (Standard Errors in Parentheses)\textsuperscript{a}

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<th>Model 3</th>
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<td>(2.25)</td>
<td>(2.24)</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>.01</td>
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<tr>
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<td>(.02)</td>
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<td>(.02)</td>
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<td>(.63)</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
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<td>Term</td>
<td>Coefficient</td>
<td>Standard Error</td>
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<td>-------------</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Industry Concentration*Goal Specialization</td>
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<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean Centered Disposable Income * Mean Centered Goal Specialization</td>
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<td>(.91)</td>
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**Log Likelihood**

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<td>-494.61</td>
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<td>-511.42</td>
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Notes: *1462 cases, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 (two-tailed test), ‡p < .05 (one-tailed test)
Figure 1: Yearly Industry Size: Peace, Women's, Environment Social Movement Industries, 1960-1986

Rally/Demonstration
March (protesters move from one location to another, distinguished from walking in a circle)
Vigil (including silent witness and meditation)
Picket (walking in circle with picket signs)
Civil disobedience
Ceremony (celebration or protest of status transition, such as birth, death, etc.).
Dramaturgical demonstration (concerts, theatrical performance, performing arts)
Motorcade
Information distribution (tabling, petitioning-gathering, teach-ins)
Symbolic Display (menorah, crèche, cross burning, graffiti, standing displays)
Attack/Conflict/Clash
Riot/Melee/Mob Violence
Wildcat Strike/Slow Down/Sick-Ins
Boycott (organized refusal to buy or use a product or service)
Press Conference/Statement
Movement Organization Formation Announcement
Lawsuit/legal maneuver by social movement organization or group

**Women’s Movement**
- Women’s Civil Rights, general
- Federal/state funding for women’s initiatives (shelters, clinics, etc)
- Anti-Violence against women
- Equal Pay/Comparable worth
- Gender quotas/Affirmative Action
- Equal Rights Amendment (ERA)
- More positive media depictions, more depictions, fewer negative media depictions
- Anti-Discrimination in Employment
- Equality in Education

**Peace Movement**
- Peace, pacifism, general
- Disarmament, general
- Anti-Atomic testing
- Anti-Atomic weapons (construction, purchase, distribution, storage)
- Anti-Biological/chemical weapons (construction, purchase, distribution, storage)
- Anti-Afghanistan War
- Anti-Gulf War
- Anti-Yugoslavia War
- Anti-Vietnam War
- Anti-Military maneuvers
- Anti-Military infrastructure
- Anti-Export of conventional weapons
- Anti-Conventional weapons (construction, purchase, distribution, storage)
- Anti-Draft
- Anti-Korean War
- Anti-US Military Involvement in Cuba
- Anti-ROTC, Military/CIA recruitment on campus
- Anti-US Involvement in non-US Wars
- Pro- Retrieving or Recovering POW/MIA’s
- Anti-US Involvement in Central Amer.

**Environmental or Green Movement**
- Environment, general
- Soil protection
- Landscape protection (plants, trees)
- Reducing noise pollution
- Air quality protection
- Anti-Current Method of Solid Waste disposal
- Limiting waste/recycle
- Restriction of Pharmaceutical/chemicals
- Water quality protection
- Rainforest Preservation
- Ozone Protection to prevent Global Warming, etc.
- Zero Population Growth, as environmental issue
Appendix C. Examples of Dependent Variables for 3 Different Protest Organizations

1) **Peace SMI.** American Friends Service Committee (AFSC) participated in 36 different protest events in New York associated with the Peace Movement (but was not reported at events associated with the Women’s or Environmental Movements during this time period in New York). The first of these events took place in 1960 (2 events) and the last in 1982, thus we infer that this organization persisted as a Peace Protest Organization for 1960 through 1982.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th># Events</th>
<th>Failure to Protest</th>
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<th>Goal Specialization</th>
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2) **Environmental SMI.** The Sierra Club (SC) participated in 39 different protest events in New York associated with the Environmental Movement (but was not reported at events associated with the Women’s or Peace Movements during this time, in New York). The first of these events took place in 1966 and the 1986, thus we infer survival of this organization as an Environmental Protest Organization for 1966 through 1986.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th># Events</th>
<th>Failure to Protest</th>
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<th>Goal Specialization</th>
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### 3) Women’s SMI

Women’s Action Equity League (WAEC) participated in 5 events in New York associated with the Women’s Movement (but was not reported at events associated with the Environmental or Peace Movements during this time, in New York). The first of these events took place in 1974 and the last in 1986, thus we infer survival of this organization as a Women’s Protest Organization for 1974 through 1986.

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